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I am afraid you are like the Bishop of Oxford who said
"Orthodoxy is my doxy and heterodoxy is somebody else's doxy."
Of course, I realize, and I am sure every thinking man does, that
employees being human beings, they are like employers, and that
human nature does not change because the individual is an employee
or because he is an employer. We all have the frailties of our
common nature. We are prone to control the people with whom we
deal and exercise authority over. Interesting things appear in the
cases that come to court where there is an impartial atmosphere as
the judge sits down to examine the facts, we get some very
interesting cases.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict is inherent in human interactions, whether or not power
imbalances, or perceived power imbalances, exist between people. Human
nature is always part of the problem, and always part of the solution. Conflict
and its resolution transgress the boundaries of every historical era because of
the universal, enduring, and repetitive nature of human interactions. Thus,
conflict and its modes of resolution are processes that survive the span of any
single lifetime. It is universally, and eternally, evidenced by the struggle
between people about real or perceived differences in viewpoint, economic
and social interests, cultural values, moral and religious tenets, etc. The
search for peaceful resolutions to conflict throughout Anglo-American legal
history (as in other historical contexts) almost invariably aims at preserving
** 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at
1649-50 (1949) (James A. Emery, National Association of Manufacturers, in colloquy
with Sen. Robert Wagner, Senate Committee on Education and Labor).
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human life, limb, and the broader social and economic interests associated
with the goal of preserving a stable civic polity. '
This Article is part of an ongoing study of evolving approaches to the
peaceful processing of disputes throughout Anglo-American legal history.2
The goals of that study are to foster greater understanding of, and scholarly
discourse about, the uses and roles of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
historical as well as contemporary legal systems. In some cases, the results of
the study may suggest perspectives of first impression. In other cases, it may
suggest revisions of historical perception and the prevailing historical
narrative about the nature of dispute processing in a given era of English or
American legal history. The focus of the present Article is on a single
"micro-period" of American legal history relating to the resolution of labor
disputes during the New Deal era. That period in American political and
legal history, presided over by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, inspired the
governmental crafting of experimental social reforms and the creation of
numerous administrative entities whose chief aim was to fulfill the "New
Deal" struck between the federal government and the American polity during
the Great Depression. The chief aim of that New Deal, as articulated by
President Roosevelt, was to right the imbalance of economic power between
1 One early exception to this preference for the preservation of life and limb in the
resolution of disputes during Anglo-American legal history was the partial sanctioning of
the bloodfeud in early Anglo-Saxon England, at the earliest stages of English legal
history. It was during this period that legal process was first introduced to post-Roman
English society as a peaceful alternative to this violent method of self-help which had
been a normative procedure for resolving disputes under the Teutonic customary law
imported to England by the Germanic tribes (the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes) that
occupied the island after the Romans vacated it. See Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a
History of ADR: The Dispute Processing Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England and Today,
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11-12 (1996) [hereinafter Sanchez, Towards a History
of ADR] (discussing the Anglo-Saxon bloodfeud); see also William I. Miller, Choosing
the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in Medieval Iceland and England, 1 LAW &
HISTORY REv. 159, 160-75 (1983).
2 See, e.g., Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR, supra note 1. The study will
culminate in a multi-volume series exploring variant uses of dispute resolution processes
on a broad time spectrum, ranging from the early Medieval period in English and
Continental legal history, through the Colonial and post-Colonial periods of American
legal history, to the current era of "renewed" globalization in the 21st century. I began
this lengthy study as a Graduate Fellow at Harvard Law School under the tutelage of the
late Professor Emeritus of Legal History Samuel E. Thorne, and Professor Frank E. A.
Sander. To date, I have published two articles germane to this research. See generally id.;
Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 669 (2003) [hereinafter Sanchez, Back to the Future of
ADR].
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"the prosperous man at the top of the pyramid and the forgotten man, the
little man, at the bottom." 3 One product of that New Deal was the
formulation of an American labor policy deeply rooted in the use of ADR to
resolve labor disputes, but also seemingly at odds with its use in the final
stages of that policy's rhetoric on, and agenda for, law enforcement.
American labor policy came into being with the passage of the Wagner
Act in 1935 (also referred to herein as the "National Labor Relations Act" or
"NLRA"). The primary dispute resolution institution created by that Act was
the National Labor Relations Board (also referred to herein as the "NLRB"
or "Board").4 Congress gave that Board the status of an independent agency,
rather than placing it within the purview of the Department of Labor. The
nature of the dispute resolution function of that Board was a source of
confusion to contemporaries of the Wagner Act. It remains so today, as is
evident from the array of erroneous or incomplete descriptions of the dispute
resolution processes employed by the Board to enforce the Wagner Act.
Underlying this confusion was a historical perspective fertile with ideas
about the spectrum of dispute resolution processes used during this era to
resolve labor disputes under numerous federal statutes. This expansive
thinking about dispute processing, and the experience which informed it, was
richly complex. It was evident in Congressional hearings about the dispute
processing design of the NLRB. It also informed the actual workings of the
NLRB and its use of an array of ADR processes after the passage of the
Wagner Act.
After a period marked by the widespread, almost orthodox, use of ADR
processes, such as mediation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration, by
federal labor boards to resolve labor disputes, Congress invested the NLRB
with adjudicatory powers. Thereafter, ADR was widely viewed as
heterodoxical to the effective enforcement of the Wagner Act. The historical
record from this period suggests an emerging new orthodoxy that trumpeted
the primacy of quasi-adjudication over ADR processes to resolve labor
disputes under the Wagner Act. It heralded the Board's investiture with the
power to adjudicate disputes in the enforcement of the Wagner Act, and
disassociated the Board's adjudicatory function from the use of ADR by
predecessor labor boards and from the continued use of ADR by other
governmental entities to resolve labor disputes that were outside the
jurisdiction of the Wagner Act.
3 Frances Perkins, Labor Under the New Deal and the New Frontier, in FRANCES
PERKINS & J. PAUL ST. SURE, TWO VIEWS OF AMERICAN LABOR 1, 3 (1965).
4 See The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1998).
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Today, there appears to be near universal acceptance of a single strand of
historical narrative about the dispute resolution function of the NLRB under
the Wagner Act. That narrative, repeated in scholarly works on labor law and
on labor-management relations, suggests that ADR was anathema to the
adjudicatory function of the NLRB under the Wagner Act.5 Another strand of
the same narrative suggests that the focus of the Wagner Act was the creation
of rights for labor, rather than the resolution of labor disputes consistent with
the aspirations of the Act.6 One labor relations textbook also suggests that a
common misperception about the Board was that it engaged in mediation and
conciliation activities to resolve labor disputes under the Act.7 A recent book
chapter on labor relations practice during World War II provided "an
historical perspective" of the NLRB's dispute resolution function that
characterized it as a watershed, marking a bright line transition from the use
of ADR to the use of adjudication to enforce federal labor law:
This period saw the transformation of the pre-Wagner Act boards from
strike settlement bodies of partisan representatives, utilizing mediation,
non-legalistic informal discussions, and voluntary cooperation to achieve
their objective to quasi-judicial bodies of neutrals deciding cases by setting
forth principles of law, conducting formal hearings, issuing rules and
regulations, and requiring legalistic uniformity in procedures. The rejection
of mediation, partisan representation and voluntarism meant that U.S. labor
policy would henceforth be developed by law and litigation through
legislative enactment, the growth of NLRB case precedent, and the
application of administrative law.8
5 See, e.g., RUTH O'BRIEN, WORKERS' PARADOX: THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NEW
DEAL LABOR POLICY 1886-1935, at 195 (1998) ("With the NLRB given authority to
investigate and adjudicate labor disputes.., the hearings were to be adversarial in
format.... Unlike the board established by the Trade Disputes bill, the NLRB could not
mediate or arbitrate a labor dispute; it had to represent the public interest.")
6 See JAMES B. ATLESON, The Law of Collective Bargaining and Wartime Labor
Regulations, in AMERICAN LABOR IN THE ERA OF WORLD WAR 1143 (1995) ("The Wagner
Act ... did not focus upon dispute resolution.").
7 See TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR RELATIONS 73 (2d ed.
1995) ("Misconceptions about the Wagner Act continued long after its passage. Despite
beliefs to the contrary, the Act provided no mediation or conciliation functions. Rather,
the NLRB served to regulate and punish employers who sometimes unwittingly violated
the law.")
8 James A. Gross, The NLRB: An Historical Perspective, in A GUIDE TO SOURCES OF
INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5-6 (Gordon T. Law, Jr. ed.,
2002) (emphasis added). Professor Gross first articulated this view over thirty years ago.
See JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A
625
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Thus, the contemporary historical narrative suggests that the Wagner Act was
informed by an orthodoxy that viewed adjudication as the sole dispute
resolution process appropriate for use in the enforcemient' of labor law under
the Wagner Act, and as the sole law enforcement process used by the NLRB.
The corollary view of ADR as heterodoxical to the effective enforcement of
the Wagner Act was evident in the rhetoric associated with the passage of the
Act, though not in the federal government's ongoing use of (and enduring
preference for) ADR to resolve labor disputes in general. Notwithstanding
that rhetoric of heterodoxy in the law enforcement context, this Article
suggests that the law enforcement framework of the administrative entity
established by Congress as the NLRB utilized ADR processes to resolve a
large number of its cases informally, through settlement agreements.9 The
NLRB's recourse to settlement agreements-or "adjustments"--was well-
known to Congress, was not prohibited by the Wagner Act, and resulted in
the emergence of a "dispute processing continuum" 10  within the
STUDY IN EcoNoMIcs, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, VOL. I, 1933-1937, at 2 (1974)
[hereinafter GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD] ("The
rejection of mediation ... meant that American labor policy would henceforth be
developed by law and litigation through... the growth of a body of NLRB case
precedent."); accord O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 195.
9 The law enforcement framework of the NLRB included Board "members"
appointed by the President of the United States and a network of "agents" acting as
Regional Directors of the Board, case examiners, and lawyers. The first series of Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the NLRB designated "regional directors, examiners,
and attorneys" employed by the Board as its "agents." See National Labor Relations
Board, Rules and Regulations, Article IV, 1 Fed. Reg. 280-81 (Aug. 28, 1936).
Notwithstanding the NLRB's broad composition, scholars and practitioners tend wrongly
to conceptualize "the NLRB," and its alternative term of reference, "the Board," too
narrowly, viewing it as a single entity, rather than as a vast law enforcement institution
encompassing both Board "members" and Board "agents" whose powers and
responsibilities are quite different. As Professor Archibald Cox and his team of
prominent labor law scholars noted:
Although it is customary to speak of 'the Board' as if the National Labor Relations
Board and its large staff of employees thought and acted as a single person, this
usage is highly misleading. In reality, the NLRB is composed of various categories
of persons exercising quite different responsibilities.
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 104 (13th ed. 2001).
10 1 created the phrase "dispute processing continuum" in an earlier article to
describe the phenomenon of a spectrum of available dispute resolution processes used
within the framework of a legal system to afford litigants the opportunity to resolve their
legal disputes through ADR processes, such as negotiation and mediation, as well as
through third-party-controlled processes, such as arbitration and adjudication. See
Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR, supra note 1, at 1-3, 33 (discussing the "hat
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"adjudicatory" law enforcement framework of the NLRB under the Wagner
Act.
The present Article therefore suggests that the widespread understanding,
after the passage of the Wagner Act, that the NLRB, by legislative design,
discontinued the use of third-party facilitated processes such as mediation
and conciliation to resolve labor disputes under the Act is, in fact, inaccurate.
In taking a new look at ADR in New Deal labor law enforcement, this Article
focuses on both rule-centered and processual evidence concerning the law
enforcement functions of the NLRB." I That evidence is contained in the
Wagner Act itself, the legislative history of the Act, the Annual Reports of
the early NLRB, and an array of historical commentaries by courts,
journalists, public servants, and scholars concerning the passage and content
of the Wagner Act, as well as the workings of the early NLRB. This evidence
changing" phenomenon of public judges in a dispute processing continuum present in the
early English legal system, distinguishing between settlement outcomes reached "at love"
and adjudicated outcomes reached "at law," and also discussing the related phenomena of
bargaining in the "shadow of the law" and bargaining in the "clear light of legal
certainty," where parties are given an opportunity to reach settlement agreements,
respectively, before and after they have received a formal decision on the merits of a
case). The classic text on the phenomenon of parties bargaining in the shadow of the law
is Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). There is much current debate about the
desirability of modem judges "changing hats" to engage in settlement processes during
the course of litigation. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV.
485 (1985); Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982).
11 A rule-centered approach to legal history involves the analysis of laws or other
official decrees for normative evidence of social conduct (and misconduct) in any given
era. By comparison, processual historical analysis involves investigation of documents
recording actual, rather than aspirational, social conduct. See Sanchez, Towards a
History of ADR, supra note 1, at 3. Any approach to legal history that takes only one of
these approaches risks overlooking important evidence necessary to describing a more
complete picture of the legal history of any era.
The distinction drawn between the processual and rule-centered approaches to legal
history is well known in the discipline of legal anthropology. See generally SALLY FALK
MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941). The essence of the distinction is that legal histories
based solely on description of rules (i.e., mandates "from above") often do not accurately
convey a picture of actual practice (i.e., the indicia of historical reality that come "from
below" the rules, reflecting how they were enforced or even augmented through non-rule
based activity). A holistic approach to legal history takes a combined rule-centered and
processual approach to the documentary evidence. See Sanchez, Towards a History of
ADR, supra note 1, at 3.
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supports the conclusion that the historical narrative about the dispute
resolution functions of the NLRB should be revised to reflect its use of ADR
to enforce the Wagner Act. It further suggests that, because of the
adjudicatory power the Wagner Act invested in the NLRB, Congress
effectively sanctioned the emergence of a dispute processing continuum
within the NLRB's enforcement practices that included the use of third-
party-facilitated, as well as third-party-controlled, dispute resolution
processes.
The dispute processing continuum that emerged within the NLRB has
historica 12 and contemporary 13 analogues. In these analogues, when the
entity of adjudication, such as a judge, can exercise both adjudicatory powers
and serve settlement functions, alternately wearing the hats of a judicial
decisionmaker empowered to decide a case and judicial facilitator of
settlement agreements between the parties, such settlement outcomes are
either mediated under the shadow of the law or in the clear light of legal
certainty, and are examples of the phenomenon of justice negotiated, rather
than justice adjudicated. 14 In a similar manner, the NLRB, as an entity of
adjudication, could either facilitate the negotiation of justice by its staff and
agents via settlement agreements reached under the shadow of the Board's
adjudicatory machinery to enforce the Wagner Act (or with the benefit of the
clear light of legal certainty provided by it), or it could exert its adjudicatory
powers to reach formal decisions, thereby adjudicating justice.
12 See generally Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR, supra note 1.
13 The "Multi-Door Courthouse" is one contemporary example of a dispute
processing continuum within the framework of a courthouse-the institution associated
today with the resolution of legal disputes. Another is the phenomenon that could be
dubbed the "Multi-Door Courtroom," wherein a judge acts alternately as adjudicator and
settlement facilitator. See supra note 10 (concerning the settlement functions of judges).
Harvard Law Professor Frank E.A. Sander first articulated this idea of the "Multi-Door
Courthouse" in 1976. See FRANK E.A. SANDER, THE MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE:
SETrLING DIsPUTES IN THE YEAR 2000 (1976); Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-
Door Courthouse Idea: Building the Courthouse of the Future... Today, 1 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 7, 9 (1985). A central feature of the "Multi-Door Courthouse"
experiment is that it places practitioners of ADR within the purview of a court, giving
parties to a lawsuit access to non-adjudicatory processes to resolve their legal disputes
before taking that dispute before a judge. Thus, the courthouse provides parties access to
adjudication and alternatives to it (i.e., ADR). Each of these processes, including
adjudication, is located-metaphorically speaking-behind a different "door" within this
"Multi-Door Courthouse."
14 See Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR, supra note 2, at 671-74; see also supra
note 10 (discussing the phenomena of bargaining under the "shadow of the law" and in
"the clear light of legal certainty").
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II. THE ETHOS OF LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NEW DEAL ERA:
PROCESS PARADIGMS
By the beginning of the New Deal era, the federal government had a
history of experimenting with non-adjudicatory methods of dispute
resolution to resolve industrial relations conflict. 15 President Roosevelt's
Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, expressed the view, in her testimony to
Congress during the hearings on the Wagner Act, that continued
experimentation with these processes in the labor law enforcement arena was
central to government's fulfillment of the New Deal's broader mission:
[T]his process of experimentation should, it seems to me, be allowed to
continue. We have not yet reached the limits of the possibilities of
cooperation or the possibilities for a great variety of devices to bring about
the right relationship between employer and employee interests in a great
democracy which is, after all, devoted constructively to the interests of all
the people, not only the two great parties of the industrial situation [i.e.
management and labor]. 1 6
The admixture of non-adjudicatory dispute resolution processes used by New
Deal, and pre-New Deal, labor relations boards included negotiation,
mediation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration. In the nomenclature of the
New Deal, these processes were defined as they are today, but without use of
the umbrella acronym, ADR, used in this Article and, of course, in the
contemporary U.S. legal system to distinguish these processes from
adjudication, and describe them as "alternatives" to it.
15 See, e.g., Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (1888) (providing for
voluntary mediation and compulsory fact-finding in railway labor disputes); Erdman Act
of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (providing for the mediation and voluntary
arbitration of railway labor disputes); Newlands Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913)
(creating a Board of Mediation and Conciliation to resolve railway labor disputes);
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1988) (originally called the United
States Arbitration Law); Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. L. 577 (1926)
(codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)) (creating the National Mediation Board to
resolve disputes arising under railway collective bargaining agreements through
mediation and arbitration); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933)
(creating the National Labor Board); Exec. Order No. 6763, June 29, 1934, reprinted in 3
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 332 (compiled by
Samuel L. Rosenman, 1938) (abolishing the National Labor Board and creating the First
National Labor Relations Board).
16 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 50
(1949) (statement of Frances Perkins) [hereinafter 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NLRA].
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In one of her many statements to Congress during its hearings on the
Wagner bill, Secretary Perkins described the salient qualities of the non-
adjudicatory processes-voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation-
practiced by the Department of Labor:
Arbitration is a function which, as is well known, can be exercised only
when both parties to a controversy agree to permit a third party to act as an
arbitrator and agree to abide by the decision of that third party. The
Department of Labor can exercise the function of arbitration when both
sides agree to it.
The Department of Labor can also act as mediator, that is, it can of its
own interposition and without invitation of either side, intervene in an
industrial dispute with suggestions as to the ways of bringing the conflicting
parties into agreement, with suggestions perhaps as to the formula upon
which they may agree.
It can also act in a third capacity of conciliation, by which is meant
commonly a more or less negative activity in which the conciliator attempts
to be the go-between between the parties who are in conflict until they,
acting through him, come to some formula which it appears can be mutually
agreed upon. Thereupon he retires from the scene leaving them to agree. 17
These processes were paradigmatic of those practiced by the various
labor boards preceding the passage of the Wagner Act. The Congressional
testimony of Milton Handler, Professor of Law at Columbia University, who
served as General Counsel of one such board, the National Labor Board
(discussed in Part II.A.1 of this Article), describes the evolution of that
board's recourse to a similar array of dispute resolution processes as it
adapted to the exigencies of the moment in order to resolve industrial
disputes and ultimately enforce § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (also referred to herein as "NIRA"), sanctioning labor's rights to
unionize and bargain collectively prior to the passage of the Wagner Act1 8:
17 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
18 See National Industrial Recovery Act, supra note 15, § 7(a); see also infra note
30. The chief aims of the National Industrial Recovery Act were
to reduce unemployment, to increase purchasing power, and to insure just rewards to
both capital and labor by eliminating unfair competition .... The [NIRA] suspended
the anti-trust laws and authorized industries to organize representative associations
and to frame codes of fair competition, which, upon approval by the President,
should become binding upon the whole industry. An approved code constituted the
standard for the industry or trade, and violations were deemed an unfair method of
competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
President was also given authority to impose codes on industries which refused or
failed to frame acceptable codes for themselves, and also to move to punish violators
[Vol. 20:3 2005]
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[W]hile the [National Labor] Board was initially designed to mediate
industrial disputes, it has served as a board of arbitration in cases where
joint submissions were voluntarily made to the Board, and in the course of
time it took on a new function, namely the enforcement of section 7(a) of
the Recovery Act .... The Board also [had] a compact administrative staff
which [was] ... set up to supervise the work of the regional boards, to
control the field work, prepare the hearings before the full Board, to
conduct research and advise the Board on the legal phases of the problems
that [were] presented to it, and to supervise the compliance with the Board's
rulings. 19
Professor Handler's description of how this pre-NLRB board processed labor
disputes illustrates the emerging framework of a dispute processing
continuum in the National Labor Board's practice. That emerging continuum
began with the National Labor Board's use of a non-adjudicatory process
(i.e., mediation) to achieve settlement outcomes or "adjustments" of the
dispute, and culminated in its use of more formal intervention in the dispute,
such as voluntary arbitration or voluntary adjudication:
Upon refusal of the employer to deal with the officials of a union a strike is
called. Now as soon as the board learns of the strike it sends a mediator to
the field to adjust the dispute if that be possible. If he fails, the parties are
then summoned to appear before the full Board, which is either a regional
board or the National Labor Board, depending upon the importance of the
case. Strikes have generally been settled along the following lines, after full
hearing by the Board: An Agreement is made between the parties to the
dispute and the Board and it provides typically for the following: First, the
strike is called off and the workers are reinstated without discrimination; an
election is held to determine who shall represent the workers and to settle
this disputed question of the authority of the officials of the union to
represent the workers. The employer agrees to bargain collectively with the
representatives selected at this election held under the board's supervision
and the parties agree to submit all their differences which cannot be settled
by negotiation either to a board of arbitration or to the National Labor
of codes that had received his approval. By the end of the first month of the N.I.R.A.
over 400 codes had been filed and eventually the total reached 677, including
activities ranging from steel production to pants pressing, although unfortunately,
many of the codes were too hastily drawn .... It should not be surprising under the
circumstances that some industries drew up codes that gave them monopolistic
powers.
ERNEST L. BOGART & DONALD L. KEMMERER, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 653 (2d ed. 1947); see also infra text accompanying note 32.
19 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 59 (statement of Milton
Handler).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Board or the regional labor board for final decision.... [This]
procedure... has been entirely voluntary. In the great bulk of the cases
before the board [sic] this method has been eminently successful. The
mediators have settled on just and equitable terms innumerable strikes in the
field, and the mere existence of this administrative machinery, the local and
national boards, has been responsible for the averting of countless
disputes. 20
The perceived weaknesses of this emerging dispute processing continuum
were its voluntariness and the National Labor Board's lack of enforcement
power. It could neither compel compliance with its administrative procedures
nor enforce its decisions. As Professor Handler explained to Congress during
the Wagner Act hearings:
[D]ifficulty has arisen where the parties have refused to appear before the
Board, where the terms of settlement proposed by the Board have been
rejected, where the employers have refused to furnish the Board with their
payrolls and the cooperation which is essential if a fair and reliable election
is to be held, and finally, where the hearings disclosed violation of the
statute. In this last instance the lack of power on the part of the Board to
enforce its decision and its inadequate facilities for the detection of
violations, have made it difficult to enforce the law with desirable vigor and
promptness. 21
Congress' purpose in obtaining testimony on the operation of the National
Labor Board in its hearings on the Wagner bill was to assist it in crafting the
features of the soon-to-be National Labor Relations Board in a manner that
would capitalize on the perceived strengths, and also circumvent the
perceived weaknesses, of this predecessor board.
A central theme of these legislative hearings on the Wagner bill with
regard to the design of the National Labor Relations Board concerned
whether the new Board should practice the array of dispute resolution
processes used by its predecessor board in conjunction with a stronger quasi-
judicial power for enforcing the law, or whether its dispute resolution
function should be limited to adjudication. 22 Secretary Perkins' opinion was
that the new Board should exercise an adjudicatory function only, leaving the
offices of the Department of Labor with exclusive exercise of the alternative,
2 0 Id. at 60.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 51 (statement
of Frances Perkins), 60, 66 (statement of Milton Handler), 1464 (statement of Francis
Biddle).
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non-adjudicatory processes. 2 3 Her viewpoint was largely informed by a
perspective of ADR relative to adjudication in law enforcement and law
making that was akin to one articulated more recently, during the
contemporary ADR movement, by critics of ADR (most notably that of Yale
law professor, Owen Fiss24). Perkins associated the adjudicatory process, but
not ADR processes, with what she described as the "practice of justice":
A judicial board ought to be building up the body of our law and the body
of our understanding, and our interpretation of law which we may come to
count upon as a set of precedents.... This [proposed] board [under the
Wagner bill], I think, should be confined to the practice of justice in this
very unusual field, whereas the function of conciliation and mediation is an
important function, but I do not think it should be performed by the same
board.2 5
Secretary Perkins thus encouraged the continued use of ADR processes by
the Department of Labor, but not by the proposed new board under the
Wagner bill:
The continuation of the function of conciliation in the Department of Labor
closely allied with the [proposed] ... Board is, I think, highly desirable.
Moreover, I think the [proposed] ... Board, recognizing as it will in certain
cases that come before it, that as a practical matter the proper technique in
the particular case is not a judicial decision but conciliation-that is, many
cases are brought, as you know, almost in the spirit of litigation and will be
brought before any board which is a judicial board in the spirit of litigation,
and the judge sitting upon that case sees at once that what is really needed is
not a judicial decision but some negotiation, some method of bringing
parties together to agree upon a compromise which will meet the particular
situation-the board should have the power to establish or to authorize the
creation of boards of conciliation or boards of mediation or to refer the case
for conciliation or for mediation to a properly constituted authority, but I
feel that it should itself not engage and so impair its prestige in actual
conciliation as it has been obliged to do [in its present, pre-Wagner Act
form]. 2 6
23 Id. at 51 (statement of Frances Perkins).
24 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
25 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 51 (statement of Frances
Perkins).
26 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Thus, Secretary Perkins was strongly opposed to the creation of a labor
board that exercised a "mixed" dispute resolution function. In her view, ADR
should have a separate institutional situs of practice, outside the framework
of an institution such as the proposed board which, similar to a court, would
be empowered to adjudicate cases, enforce those decisions through statutory
recourse to the Federal court system, and develop a body of legal precedent
under the Wagner Act that would be analogous to the common law.27
However, there were detractors from Perkins' view. Milton Handler, for
example, urged Congress to create a mixed-function board, but to invest it
with stronger adjudicatory powers than those vested in the National Labor
Board on which he had served:
Mediation is most successful when undertaken by a single individual. For
this reason it is contemplated, under the bill, in continuation of our past
practice, of having an experienced staff of mediators for field work. But
where such mediation fails, and it does fail in many cases, unless there is to
be a continuation of strife, it is imperative that there be some agency with
adequate prestige to intervene in the interest of the public, and to bring
about a peaceful settlement. It is for that reason that I urge that the bill
re[t]ain the mediation functions of the present Board .... For the
enforcement of the law, added powers are needed. Enforcement, to be
effective, must be speedy.... Hence the need of an administrative agency
with the power to issue orders enforceible [sic] in the courts.28
This, and other testimony, as well as data about the strengths and weaknesses
of the dispute processing experiments of labor boards that immediately
preceded the Wagner Act's NLRB, shaped Congress' final design of the
NLRB's system for enforcing the Wagner Act and processing disputes
arising under it. That historical record now serves as valuable evidence of
both the rule-based and processual underpinnings of these boards, enabling
us to see more fully how they actually processed labor disputes and worked
to enforce labor law during this era.29
A. Predecessors of the NLRB
The National Labor Relations Board had numerous predecessors. Each of
these predecessors was designed to serve a dispute resolution function
associated with the implementation of federal labor law.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 60, 66 (statement of Milton Handler).
29 See supra note 11 (discussing the rule-centered and processual approaches to
legal history).
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1. The National Labor Board (1933-34)
The National Labor Board was the first federal labor board to undertake
the function of implementing the first statutory incarnation of labor's rights
to organize, engage in collective bargaining with employers, and refrain from
joining company unions, accorded by § 7(a) of the New Deal's National
Industrial Recovery Act.30 President Roosevelt created the National Labor
Board in 1933 by executive order to "handle labor disputes" arising from
§ 7(a) of the NIRA, 31 and to foster "voluntary" compliance with it. As
Secretary Perkins explained to Congress, the NIRA was a grand-scale
economic plan to pull the United States out of the Great Depression:
The National [Industrial] Recovery Act was a piece of economic planning
that.., called for each industry to set up a code with standards for both
business and labor that each firm would abide by. The N[I]RA proved to be
a really remarkable instrument, first, from an educational standpoint and,
second, by terminating bad practices and insuring compliance with the
hours and wages provided for in the Act.... However, the most important
part of the Act as far as labor was concerned was Section 7(a). This section
gave to labor the fight to organize and bargain collectively.... During the
first year of the National [Industrial] Recovery Act... over a million
30 Section 7(a) was the first federal legislative provision giving labor (i.e., private
sector, non-railway employees) the fight to engage in collective bargaining with their
employers. It provided that
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor or their agents in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
1 NLRB ANN. REP. 4 (1936), reprinted in 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ANNUAL REPORTS, 1936-1942 (1985) [hereinafter 1 NLRB REPORTS] (quoting National
Industry Recovery Act, supra note 15, § 7(a)(1)). Section 7(a) also contained a second
provision relating to company unions. It provided that "no employee and no one seeking
employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union
or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own
choosing." Id. (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, supra note 15, § 7(a)(2)); cf
Railway Labor Act of 1926, supra note 15, § 2 (establishing the "duty" of railway
employers and employees "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions" and providing that
"representatives" of employers and employees shall be "designated by ... means of
collective action, without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party
over the self-organization or designation of representatives by the other").
31 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 4.
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people joined the labor movement. It was a period of great energy and
activity in a group of people who had almost ceased to function as a
movement. With this came a new spark of life in people who ought to have
been organizing long before and who ought to have been taking the lead in
expressing their views and opinions, but who had never had any political
power or force. The self-propelling, self-directing activity began that made
the modem labor unions of America so effective for their own people, and
so persuasive to other people.... The program went very well for the first
five or six different industries but then began to run into trouble.... The
principle cause of its failure was its attempt to spread its jurisdiction over
too many and comparatively insignificant industries.32
Soon after the implementation of the NIRA began, President Roosevelt
"proposed that all employers not yet under a code subscribe to the
President's Reemployment Agreement. '33 This was an agreement that set
forth "certain labor standards and incorporat[ed]" portions of § 7(a) of the
NIRA. 3 4 Companies that complied with the terms of the NIRA were issued
"Blue Eagles."35 The Blue Eagle was not only a governmental logo to be
openly displayed by corporations and valued by some as a patriotic "badge of
honor."36 It also gave its holder a valued economic privilege: eligibility to
32 Perkins, supra note 3, at 11-12; see also supra note 18.
13 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 4 (emphasis added).
34 See id. At the time the National Labor Board was created, it was possible for each
industry to establish a code that would "carry provisions for a labor relations board for
the particular industry covered by the code." Id. However, "[m]ost of the codes thereafter
contained no such provisions... and by necessity the National Labor Board took
jurisdiction over all labor disputes arising under either the codes or the President's
Reemployment Agreement." Id.; see infra note 64.
35 The "Blue Eagle" was the icon of the National Recovery Administration:
According to historian Arthur Schlesinger, 'One day, after talking with Henry
Wallace about thunderbird, the general sketched a figure modeled on the old Indian
ideograph. Suitably retouched by a professional, this grew into the Blue Eagle.
Bearing the legend, "We Do Our Part," it became NRA's symbol of
compliance ....
GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8, at 123-
24, n.66 (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 114
(1959)).
The government sent NRA employer code agreements to every employer
nationwide. When the employer signed the code and returned it to the post office, the
post office gave him a Blue Eagle insignia for display in storefronts. See Russell Owen,
Over the Nation the Blue Eagle Wings, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1933, at 102.
36 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Third 'Fireside Chat' - 'The Simple Purposes
and the Solid Foundations of Our Recovery Program (radio broadcast, July 24, 1933),
636
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contract with the U.S. Government.3 7 In the economic hard times of the
Depression, this privilege was often vital to the survival of a company. The
National Recovery Administration (also referred to herein as the "NRA")
could remove the Blue Eagle from an employer for noncompliance with the
requirements of the NIRA. 38 In the eyes of many employers, this was a
daunting enforcement mechanism. It was also one that could be instigated by
the National Recovery Administration Compliance Board to "enforce" a
decision of the National Labor Board that went ignored by an employer.
39
The National Labor Board had jurisdiction over labor disputes that arose
under the NIRA and the President's Reemployment Agreement but was
limited to reviewing alleged violations of § 7(a). 40 As a result of widespread
defiance of § 7(a) by large employers who, presumably, could survive
without the aide of the economic privileges associated with having "Blue
Eagle" status, President Roosevelt issued a series of executive orders
following his establishment of the National Labor Board that were designed
to foster and coerce corporate compliance with that board's jurisdiction. 41 In
December of 1933, Roosevelt "gave the [National Labor] Board the right to
adjust all industrial disputes arising out of the operation of the President's
Reemployment Agreement or the codes, and 'to compose all conflicts
threatening the industrial peace of the country.' 42 Two months later,
Roosevelt issued two additional executive orders adding to the Board's
powers. One gave the Board "the right to conduct [union] elections" for the
purpose of designating the appropriate representatives of employees in the
reprinted in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra
note 15, at 301 (describing the Blue Eagle as a "badge of honor" to be displayed
"prominently," and likening it to a "bright badge" worn on the shoulders of soldiers
during wartime "to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades... [and that] those
who cooperate in the program.. . know each other at a glance.").
37 See Exec. Order No. 6246, Aug. 10, 1933 (making federal government's contracts
for supplies subject to contractor's compliance with the NIRA); Exec. Order 6646, March
14, 1934 (requiring all bidders for governmental contracts to certify compliance with the
NIRA).
38 See Exec. Order No. 6246, supra note 37 ("If the contractor fails to comply...
the Government may by written notice to the contractor terminate the contractor's right to
proceed with the contract .. "); see also 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5 (stating
that the failure to comply with NIRA could result in loss of Blue Eagle status).
39 See id.; see also infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
40 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5.
41 See id. at 5-6; see also GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, supra note 8, at 41-59.
42 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis added).
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collective bargaining process.43 The other provided that it "could report its
findings of violations of section 7(a) and its recommendations to the
Attorney General for possible prosecution or to the Compliance Division of
the [National Recovery Administration] for appropriate action."44 Both
orders were designed to curb the "flagrant cases of defiance of the Board by
large employers" who rightly perceived a lack of enforcement power in the
National Labor Board's authority.45
Within a very short period of time following its creation, the
administrative entity known as the National Labor Board had become a
multi-tiered structure consisting of the board itself, numerous regional
boards, and agent-employees:
In order to take care of the large number of disputes arising under section
7(a), it established 20 regional boards, composed of representatives of labor
and industry, with a representative of the public as impartial chairman, to
adjust cases and hold hearings in the regions where the controversies arose,
and thus expedite the cases and enable the parties to avoid the burden of
coming to Washington. 46
The dispute resolution practices of the National Labor Board bureaucracy
ranged from the facilitation of "settlements" to the issuance of "decisions. '47
Its Chairman, Senator Robert Wagner, reported that during its nine months of
existence, the Board and its regional offices handled "3,755 cases, of which
3,061, or 80 percent, were settled by the boards. '48 Thus, as Wagner
explained to Congressional colleagues during the hearings on the Wagner
Act,
[a]pproximately two-thirds of these settlements were agreements, and
agreements spell sound settlements. The boards mediated 1,323 strikes,
involving 870,000 workers, not counting many more thousands directly
affected. Three-fourths of these strikes were settled. In addition, 497 strikes
were averted. Thus, the boards in strike situations alone returned to work or
kept at work 1,270,000 workers directly involved, or about 1,500,000
including workers directly affected. Moreover, the boards reinstated 10,000
43 See id. (quoting Exec. Order, Dec. 16, 1933).
44 See id. (citing Exec. Orders, Feb. 1 and 23, 1934).
45 Id. at 4.
4 6 Id. (emphasis added).
4 7 Id. at 5.
48 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1211-12 (emphasis
added).
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men found to have been discriminated against and unjustly discharged. Of
the 3,755 cases, the primary cause of complaint in 2,655 cases was alleged
violation of section 7(a), the collective-bargaining provision of the recovery
law. 49
In addition to its facilitation of settlement agreements, the board "held
hearings and issued findings and recommendations in cases where no
settlement had been achieved. Most of these decisions involved the
interpretation of section 7(a), and its application to the facts of particular
cases." 50 In cases where the board's decision was defied, or "not accepted,"
by the employer, the board sent its decision to the Compliance Division of
the National Recovery Administration with the recommendation that the
employer's Blue Eagle be removed.51 Figure 1 provides the statistical data
preserved in the historical record about the number of cases settled by the
National Labor Board.
Figure 1
National Labor Board Cases and Settlement Statistics, 1933--34
Total Cases Agree- Deci- Pending S7(a) Total Strikes Joint
Cases Settled ments sions Cases Strikes Settled Arbitration
National
Labor 258 186 80 66 30 202 148 123 11
Board
Regional
Labor 3,497 2,875 1,877 689 423 2,453 1,175 882 149
Boards
TOTAL 3755 3,061 1,957 755 453 2,655 ,323 1,005 160
Source: 1 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA 1212 (1949) (Tables I-III)
49 Id. But cf. 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5 (stating that the National Labor
Board "settled 1,019 strikes, involving 644,209 employees, . . . averted strikes in 498
cases involving 481,617 employees... [and] settled about 1,800 disputes in cases where
there were no strikes or threats of strikes").
50 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5.
51 See id.
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Thus, in difficult cases, the enforcement powers of the National Labor
Board depended upon a network of agencies for its efficacy. During its short
institutional life (from August 5, 1933, until June 9, 1934), it "valiantly
attempted to compose labor disputes, to interpret the collective bargaining
provision of the N.[I.]R.A. [§ 7(a)], and to ascertain and inhibit unfair labor
practices." 52 The National Labor Board functioned as a "bi-partisan
body.., which strove to make effective the collective bargaining rights
written into Section 7(a) of the... Act."' 53 However, despite the ambitious
and far-reaching goals of the NIRA, and the tough enforcement rhetoric
issued from the Roosevelt administration, the two umbrella agencies
established to effectuate the NIRA, the National Recovery Administration
headed by General Hugh Johnson and the Public Works Administration
directed by Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, lacked the level of coordination,
breadth of enforcement powers, and resources needed to bring recalcitrant
business entities into compliance with the law's aspirations.54 The
"enforcement" successes of the National Recovery Administration under
Johnson were largely "voluntary," more the product of Johnson's determined
personality and a vigorous public relations campaign than the result of force
or threat of legal sanction under the NIRA. 55 With the abrasive behavioral
display of a governmental "bully," Johnson took to the enforcement initiative
in the various industries with "evangelistic fervor," drawing up regulatory
codes for them and
launching a national campaign aimed at getting the public to pressure
employers to agree to the N.R.A. minimum-wage and maximum-hour
standards. The idea was that buyers would boycott firms that did not
cooperate, that did not display the official sticker bearing a blue eagle and
the legend "We Do Our Part."'56
Although the NIRA did not succeed in bringing about economic recovery, it
did succeed in hurting small businesses that refused to comply with its
52 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1119 (emphasis added).
The term "compose" is used interchangeably with the terms "adjust" and "settle" in the
legislative history of the NLRA. See infra note 128.
53 j. Warren Madden, The New Labor Relations Board, 25 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 179,
179-81 (1935).
5 4 See DONALD R. McCoy, COMING OF AGE: THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
1920s AND 1930s, at 210 (1973).
55 See TED MORGAN, FDR: A BIOGRAPHY 388-90 (1985) (describing the personality
of Hugh Johnson).
56 MCCoy, supra note 54, at 210.
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standards. 57 In addition, it created approximately two million jobs (rather
than the six million target), improved business ethics, "considerably reduced
sweatshops and child labor," and strengthened the organized labor movement
by making "the concept of minimum wages and maximum working hours a
continuing national objective ...."58
In an article published in the New York Times in June of 1934,
Massachusetts Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor that conducted the Congressional hearings on the
original Wagner bill and its subsequent versions, discussed, for public
consumption, the shortcomings of the National Labor Board as one of the
forces that moved Congress to consider this new, broad-sweeping labor law
reform legislation:
A rising tide of labor unrest is plainly manifest. Strikes and threats of
strikes are increasing in number and magnitude....
Labor, with a capital L, regards the right to strike as one that cannot be
alienated and of which it cannot be deprived except in circumstances where
public safety is jeopardized....
If we accept the foregoing premise, then it is obvious that we cannot by
statute make arbitration of all labor disputes mandatory, for compulsory
arbitration, if it is to be effective, must carry with it compulsory obedience,
and that destroys the right to strike....
Congress, in setting up a new deal for industry in N[I]RA, likewise
provided a new deal for labor. No section of the Recovery Act was more
intensely disputed than Section 7a, both in the framing of the bill and in its
subsequent operation....
The National Labor Board, created last year by Presidential Executive
order and headed by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, has valiantly
attempted to compose labor disputes, to interpret the collective bargaining
provision of the N[I]RA [§ 7(a)] and to ascertain and inhibit unfair labor
practices. The jurisdiction of this board and its authority have been
challenged in various instances, and there has been very general recognition
of the desirability, if not indeed the necessity, of some statutory enactment
defining the board's powers and procedure if it is to be an effective and
permanent instrumentality for the adjustment of labor disputes....
It was the apparent need for legislation along this line which was the
genesis of the Wagner Labor Disputes Bill, introduced in Congress early in
57 See id. ("It is true that some small businesses that could not abide by NRA
standards were hurt.").
58 Id. at 210-11. Similarly, the Public Works Administration, under Harold Ickes,
increased employment while improving the infrastructure of the nation through thousands
of construction projects, ranging from the erection of 12,702 school buildings to the
laying of 50,000 miles of roads and highways. See id. at 211-12.
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the present session. This bill, in the form introduced, provoked a vast deal
of controversy and the subject was fully aired in extensive hearings before
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor.
The committee has now favorably reported to the Senate a substitute
bill... [entitled] the National Industrial Adjustment Act [proposing] to
create a national industrial adjustment board to supersede the present
National Labor Board.59
When the Wagner Act was finalized and signed by President Roosevelt over
one year later in July of 1935, its formal name, as well as that of the new
labor board it created had been changed to the "National Labor Relations
Act," and the "National Labor Relations Board," respectively. Between 1934
and 1935, the Wagner Bill evolved through a process of several legislative
incarnations.60 When Congress tabled the 1934 versions of the bill, largely
for the reason that President Roosevelt was not happy with the contents, 61
both Houses of the 73rd Congress62 subsequently passed Public Resolution
59 David I. Walsh, To Combat the Strike Crisis, Walsh Urges the Wagner Bill-The
Massachusetts Senator Says the Measure, While Defining Unfair Practices, Would Leave
Employers and Employees Free, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1934, at A l (emphasis added).
60 The first version of the bill introduced on March 1, 1934, and referred to by
members of Congress as the "Wagner-Connery labor disputes bill," 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1144, did not "come to a vote in 1934." Id. at
ix (statement of the method followed in preparing the legislative history of the NLRA);
78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra
note 16, at 15; 78 CONG. REC. 8,884 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NLRA, supra note 16, at 1144. The Senate's first version of the bill, entitled "A Bill to
Equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees, to encourage the amicable
settlement of disputes between employers and employees, to create a National Labor
Board, and for other purposes," was introduced by Senator Robert F. Wagner. See S.
2926, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note
16, at 32-37. The first House version of the bill, H.R. 8423, was introduced by
Representative William P. Connery, Jr. See H.R. 8423, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1128-40.
61 See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1144 (comments of
Representative Peavey) ("Representative Connery... [stated] he was in constant
communication with the White House on the measure for the purpose of bringing it up
for consideration at the best time. The general sentiment prevailing [was] that the
administration [was] opposed to the measure and that it [would] not be considered at
[that] session.").
62 Senate Joint Resolution 143 was passed and then followed by House Joint
Resolution 375. See H.R.J. Res. 375, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1224-25 (authorizing the President to create a
board or boards authorized to investigate claims involving violation of § 7(a) of the
NIRA for one year).
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No. 44, authorizing President Roosevelt "to establish one or more boards to
investigate the facts in labor controversies arising under section 7 (a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act or controversies which burden or
obstruct... the free flow of interstate commerce. ' 63 The resolution instituted
a procedure for judicial review by the U.S. Court of Appeals of decisions of
any such boards in cases that involved the election of employee
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining. President Roosevelt
thus acted by executive order to dissolve the National Labor Board and
establish an interim "National Labor Relations Board" in its place. That
interim board is often referred to as the "First NLRB," because it preceded,
and is thus to be distinguished from, the National Labor Relations Board
subsequently created by Congress in the Wagner Act.
2. The "First" National Labor Relations Board (1934-35)
On June 29, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the executive order
dissolving the National Labor Board and establishing its successor, the
National Labor Relations Board (herein referred to as the "First National
Labor Relations Board" or "First NLRB"), to serve the function of a
"permanent government board in the field of labor relations." 64 The vast
bureaucracy of the National Labor Board was automatically transferred to the
63 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 6.
64 Id. at 5. Exec. Order No. 6763 created the NLRB. On November 15, 1934,
Roosevelt signed Exec. Order No. 6905, appointing Francis Biddle as Chairman of the
First National Labor Relations Board following the resignation of its initial chairman,
Lloyd K. Garrison. See infra note 65. Section 2 of that order made it clear that the NLRB,
as created by Exec. Order No. 6763, "shall act only with the approval of the Secretary of
Labor; but this section shall not be construed to give the Secretary of Labor any authority
to review the findings or orders of the National Labor Relations Board in specific cases
subject to its jurisdiction." Exec. Order No. 6905 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1456-57.
In addition to the First NLRB, several industries-such as bituminous coal,
newspaper manufacturing, textiles, ship-building, and ship-repairing-witnessed the
creation of labor boards created "by codes or pursuant to Public Resolution No. 44" to
handle disputes involving section 7(a). 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 8. In
reporting on the success of these boards to President Roosevelt, the National Labor
Relations Board concluded that it was not desirable to have separate boards in separate
industries. Instead, one "impartial national board" was to be preferred with that single
board determining "in the last instance and subject only to court review, all questions of
interpretation and application of section 7 (a) ... ." Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
First National Labor Relations Board.65 Roosevelt explained that this board
"establish[ed] upon a firm statutory basis the additional machinery by which
the United States Government will deal with labor relations .. . ."66 It was
empowered to "investigate controversies and hold elections in accordance
with the terms of Public Resolution No. 44, to hold hearings and make
findings of fact regarding violations of section 7(a), and to act as a board of
voluntary arbitration." 67
The First NLRB's procedures for resolving labor disputes involved the
following:
[C]omplaints of violations of section 7 (a) were filed with the regional
board. If the controversy could not be adjusted by mediation, a hearing was
held. No formal pleadings were used, nor were strict rules of evidence
followed. The panel which heard the case rendered its findings of fact, and
where a violation was found, its recommendations of the action the
employer should take to bring about a condition in conformity with the law.
If either party appealed, or if the employer refused to comply, the case was
forwarded to the National Board, which, after oral argument or the
submission of briefs, or in some cases, further hearing, issued its decisions.
If no compliance resulted, the case might be sent to the Attorney General
65 Roosevelt appointed Lloyd K. Garrison (Dean of the University of Wisconsin
Law School), Harry A. Millis (Professor at the University of Chicago), and Edwin S.
Smith (former Commissioner of Labor and Industries for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts) to be the three members of the First National Labor Relations Board. 1
NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 6. Dean Garrison resigned in October 1934, and was
replaced by Francis Biddle (a corporate lawyer from Philadelphia) in November of that
same year. Id.; see also GRoss, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, supra note 8, at 99. This First NLRB:
continued in existence the various regional boards, but because of the burden of
administrative work which had devolved upon the nonpaid impartial chairmen of
these [regional] boards, it was decided to make the executive secretaries the
administrative heads, under the title regional director, and to install the panel system
whereby each case in the region would be heard by one representative of labor, one
representative of industry, and one representative of the public, the panel to be
chosen in each instance by the regional director. This change divided the work
among the volunteer nonpaid members of the regional boards, and abolished delay
which had resulted from attempts to get all the regional board members to sit on
each case. However, the system was permitted to remain sufficiently flexible to meet
the needs of the particular communities.
1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 6.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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for prosecution, and to the Compliance Division of the N.R.A. with a
recommendation that the employer's Blue Eagle be removed. 68
During its ten months of activity, the First NLRB "settled 703 strikes,
involving 229,640 employees[,]... succeeded in averting threatened strikes
in 605 cases, involving 536,398 employees, by securing agreements between
the parties[, and] ... settled about 1,400 disputes in cases where there were
no strikes or threats of strikes." 69 The Board reached formal decisions in 202
cases.70 In 158 of these cases, it directed compliance with the NIRA and
secured it in 46 cases. 71 In reaching these "formal decisions," the First NLRB
continued the practice of its predecessor, the National Labor Board, in
"seeking to develop a set of decisions in harmony with the language and
intent of section 7 (a), and thus make available, for the purpose of future
legislation, the knowledge and experience it had gained from the cases before
it." 72
President Roosevelt created the First NLRB to take up the reins of the
National Labor Board in the hopes that this new board would do a better job
of protecting the rights of labor and resolving labor-management disputes
involving those rights. The experience of the First NLRB
proved that the mere airing of unfair labor practices can in the great
majority of cases persuade employers that a proper relationship with their
workers cannot exist along with espionage, discrimination and willful
interference with the hope which labor cherishes to be its own master. More
than 80 percent of cases arising in all parts of the country were settled by
this Board's regional agencies. Yet it became apparent that the majority of
employers resolved to resist the law were able do so because of a lack of
final enforcement powers under the Congressional Resolution. 73
While the "life" of the First NLRB was extended by executive orders from
June 16, 1935, until its formal dissolution on August 27, 1935, the board
ceased to exist for all practical purposes on May 27, 1935, when the Supreme
68 Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
6 9 Id. at 7.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Madden, supra note 53, at 179-81.
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Court struck down the NIRA as unconstitutional in the case of A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.74
B. The "New'" National Labor Relations Board Under the Wagner Act
As if in immediate response to the Supreme Court's assault on New Deal
labor policy, within little over a month following the Schechter Poultry
decision, Congress passed the final version of the Wagner Act, which
President Roosevelt signed into law on July 5, 1935. The Wagner Act created
a "new" NLRB (herein referred to as the "NLRB" or "Board," the "new
NLRB" or "new Board," or the "post-Wagner Act NLRB" or "post-Wagner
Act Board"). This new NLRB had quasi-judicial enforcement powers that its
predecessors had lacked:
The machinery for the prevention of unfair labor practices "affecting
commerce" follow[ed] closely the familiar provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, a procedural pattern which has been repeatedly approved
as an appropriate and constitutional method for the administration of
Federal law. Whenever it is charged that an unfair labor practice affecting
commerce has been or is being engaged in, the Board or its designated
agent is authorized to issue a formal complaint stating the charges and
noticing the matter for hearing. The person complained of has the right to
file an answer, and to appear and give testimony. The testimony is reduced
to writing. Thereupon the Board states its findings of fact, and either
dismisses the complaint if found unsubstantiated by the proof or issues an
order requiring the person complained of to cease and desist from the unfair
labor practices engaged in and possibly to take incidental affirmative action
(sec. 10(b), 10 (c)) .... For the purpose of oral hearings and investigations
which are necessary and proper in the exercise of the foregoing powers, the
Board... [was] given authority to issue subpenas [sic], examine records,
administer oaths, hear witnesses, and receive evidence. 75
74 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(finding the NIRA's "code provision.., to be invalid.. . "). Only days before Schechter
came down, Roosevelt had announced his support for the Wagner bill. After the NIRA
was struck down by the Court, the Wagner bill "assumed critical importance for FDR as
the only currently visible symbol of his administration's alleged commitment to the
attainment of certain beneficial social and economic goals." George Feldman, Unions,
Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
187, 199 (1994) (quoting STANLEY ViTroz, NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY AND THE
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 148 (1987)).
75 1 NLRB ANN. REP.,supra note 30, at 11-12.
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In addition to the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, it had
jurisdiction over matters relating to workers' election of a union for
representation in an employment relationship with management, particularly
during the collective bargaining process. In this arena, it had the power to
investigate and certify to the parties the name or names of the representatives
that had been designated, provide for an appropriate hearing, and take a
secret ballot of employees or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain
such representatives. 76
The first Chairman of the new NLRB, J. Warren Madden, explained that
"[tjhe Wagner Act... was.., a reaffirmation of this principle of collective
bargaining and a resolve to set up a permanent agency with full powers of
enforcement. '77 Section 7 of the Wagner Act reenacted § 7(a) of the NIRA,
giving employees the rights to self-organize and bargain collectively. And, as
Chairman of the First NLRB, Francis Biddle, told Congress, the new NLRB
was now equipped with an old enforcement power: "The basic features of the
Wagner bill are that it establishes the right of collective
bargaining,.., defines unfair labor practices, and provides a simple and
already well-recognized method for enforcing the law." 78
In its basic framework, the enforcement power of the new Board actually
paralleled that of the old Board. Unlike court decisions or orders, the "final
decisions" or "orders" of neither board were "self-enforcing." The old NLRB
reported cases needing enforcement to the NRA Compliance Board for
enforcement. This was an administrative, not a judicial institution. However,
the Wagner Act provided the new NLRB with recourse, by petition, to an
"appropriate circuit court of appeals" in order to secure compliance. 79 These
courts were authorized by the Act to "make ... decree[s] enforcing,
modifying, or setting aside the Board's order in whole or in part."' 80 The Act
also provided that "any person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board... [could] obtain a similar review by filing in the appropriate circuit
court of appeals a petition that the order be modified or set aside." 81
76 Id. at 12.
77 Madden, supra note 53, at 179-8 1.
78 A Bill to Promote Equality of Bargaining Power Between Employers and
Employees, to Diminish the Causes of Labor Disputes, to Create a National Labor
Relations Board, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1958 Before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong. 79 (1935) (statement of Francis Biddle),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1455.
79 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 12.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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The enforcement powers of the NLRB were enhanced in other significant
ways as well. The new quasi-judicial machinery associated with proceedings
of the new Board included "authority to issue subpoenas, examine records,
administer oaths, hear witnesses, and receive evidence." 82 In addition, the
new Board could apply to a federal district court to secure a court order
"compelling" recalcitrant parties to obey a Board subpoena, and, in this
manner, subject them to penalties "available" in circuit or district courts for
failure to comply with either "cease and desist" orders of the Board or its
demands to produce books, papers, or subpoenas compelling testimony.
83
The other punitive measures available to the new Board involved fining
parties up to $5,000 or seeking their imprisonment for one year in order to
protect "the Board and its agents ... in the conduct of their
work... [against] any person who... willfully resist[ed], prevent[ed],
imped[ed], or interfere[d] with any member of the Board or any of its agents
or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to the act."'84 Thus, the
quasi-judicial structure of the new NLRB institutionalized an enhanced
version of the law enforcement practices of its predecessor boards. As Part
III of this Article illustrates, this included the institutionalization of ADR
procedures to achieve settlement agreements as a means of enforcing the
Wagner Act and resolving legal disputes arising under it.
Professor James Gross, a labor relations historian, has suggested that the
quasi-judicial dispute resolution activities of the National Labor Board and
the First NLRB emerged in practice "without authorization from the White
House" and signaled the gradual transformation of these boards "into quasi-
judicial bodies of full-time, paid neutrals, deciding cases rather than
suggesting compromises, obtaining competency in handling questions of law,
adopting more legalistic, judicial methods, shifting from persuasion to formal
hearings (including evidence, uniformity in procedures, and rules and
regulations), and asserting the independence and impartiality of the
boards."8 5 As this Article suggests, however, the emergence of these quasi-
judicial functions, "brought to fruition by the Wagner Act NLRB," actually
signaled the evolution of a board machinery more broadly equipped to call
upon the complementary functions of ADR and adjudicatory processes,
rather than those more narrowly equipped with either quasi-adjudicatory or
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 Id. at 13.
85 GROSs, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8,
at 231-32.
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ADR functions alone. 86 This processual evolution signaled the emergence of
a dispute processing continuum in which both settlement outcomes and legal
decisions were viewed as legitimate mechanisms for enforcing the Wagner
Act and resolving disputes arising under it.
C. The Rhetoric ofAdjudication as Orthodoxy: ADR Rejected
When Congress passed the Wagner Act, President Franklin Roosevelt
issued the following statement distinguishing the dispute resolution function
of the First Board from that of the new NLRB:
The National Labor Relations Board will be an independent quasi-judicial
body. It should be clearly understood that it will not act as mediator or
conciliator in labor disputes. The function of mediation remains, under this
act, the duty of the Secretary of Labor and of the Conciliation Service of the
Department of Labor. It is important that the judicial function and the
mediation function should not be confused. Compromise, the essence of
mediation, has no place in the interpretation and enforcement of the law.
This act, defining rights, the enforcement of which is recognized by the
Congress to be necessary as both an act of common justice and economic
advance, must not be misinterpreted. It may eventually eliminate one major
cause of labor disputes.., but is applicable only when violation of a legal
right of independent self-organization would burden or obstruct interstate
commerce. Accepted by management, labor, and the public with a sense of
sober responsibility and of willing cooperation, however, it should serve as
an important step toward the achievement of just and peaceful labor
relations in industry.87
The next day, the New York Times reported on the passage of the Act using
headlines that diffused the "anti-mediation" punch of the President's
statement in its enigmatic headline: "Roosevelt Signs The Wagner Bill as
'Just to Labor: It is Important Step Toward Industrial Peace but Will Not
Stop All Disputes,' He Says: MEDIATION NOT AFFECTED: President
Explains New Board Will Act Only on Violations of the Right to
Organize."88 It is no wonder that, despite the "adjudication as orthodoxy"
86 Id. at 232.
87 Id. at 9 n. 1 (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt) (emphasis added).
88 N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1935, at 1 ("The bill provides Federal machinery for the
adjudication of disputes over the right to organize when 'violation of a legal right of
independent self-organization would burden or obstruct interstate commerce.' ...
Adjudication would be placed in the hands of a permanent National Labor Relations
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rhetoric that ushered in the Wagner Act and the new NLRB, many
contemporaries of the New Deal legislation, including the judges who were
asked to assess the Wagner Act's constitutionality, remained confused about
the dispute resolution processes used by the NLRB to enforce the Act. Some
of these judges viewed the new NLRB as a "conciliation" board, while others
thought it allowed for "compulsory arbitration." 89 From a processual
standpoint, each of these views was partially correct given the multiple
approaches the Board took on a case by case basis, ranging from the
facilitation of settlement agreements reached through mediation and
conciliation to the issuance of formal decisions on the merits of a case
Board, to supercede the board carrying the same title which was organized under the
National Recovery Act.").
89 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 49. ("Some judges had the impression
that this act was one providing for compulsory arbitration. Others thought that is was
merely a statute of conciliation."). Much of the early litigation involving the Wagner Act
resulted from a concerted challenge to its constitutionality mounted by prominent
members of the legal community within months of the Act's passage. On September 5,
1935, the National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League printed a widely
publicized "assault on the constitutionality of the act.., as a deliberate and concerted
effort by a large group of well-known lawyers to undermine the public confidence in the
statute, to discourage compliance with it, to assist attorneys generally in attacks on the
statute, and perhaps to influence the courts." Id. at 46-47. The document, entitled "Report
on the Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act," [hereinafter Report] was
132 pages in length and was authored by 58 nationally prominent lawyers, one of whom
was a former U.S. Attorney General and two of whom were former U.S. Solicitors
General. J. Warren Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor
Relations Board, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 234, 242-43 (1960). The Report's conclusion,
summarized in its opening statement, read as follows: "Considering the Act in the light of
our history, the established form of government, and the decisions of our highest Court,
we have no hesitancy in concluding that it is unconstitutional and that it constitutes a
complete departure from our constitutional and traditional theories of government." Id. at
242.
During the first year of the NLRB's enforcement of the Wagner Act, opponents of
the Act instigated numerous injunction proceedings to hinder, if not bring to a halt, the
NLRB's enforcement activities. See Seymour S. Mintz, Note, Suits to Enjoin the National
Labor Relations Board, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 391 (1936). Professor Gross has
calculated that between 1935 and 1936, 1,600 injunctions were issued. See GROSS, THE
MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8, at 205. These
injunctions involved "'well over a third of the entire corps' of federal court judges
restraining various acts of Congress." 1d. (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHESLINGER, THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 447-48 (1960)). Many of the federal district court opinions in
these cases were unpublished. One published opinion characterizing the NLRB as a
compulsory arbitration board is Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp 58, 70
(N.D. I11. 1936) ("compulsory unilateral arbitration.., is the heart of the act").
650
[Vol. 20:3 20051
ADR IN NEW DEAL LABOR LAW
reached through the new Board's quasi-adjudicatory function (akin to
compulsory, as distinguished from voluntary, arbitration). 90  One
contemporary social scientist who took note of the NLRB's use of
conciliation and mediation during its first year of operations proposed that
Congress amend the Wagner Act "to regularize the conciliatory and informal
functions of the National Labor Relations Board. 91
In seeking to foster a description of the new NLRB as a governmental
agency equipped with stronger enforcement powers than its predecessor
boards, President Roosevelt and members of Congress hoped to draw a
fundamental distinction between the perceived weakness of the First NLRB
as a "mediation board" and the promised strength of the "new" post-Wagner
Act NLRB as a quasi-judicial board. Their goal was to convey to "the
reactionary anti-New Deal economic elite" 92 a central message: Individual
worker's rights to unionize and bargain collectively that had been vulnerable
to evasion under the non-adjudicatory dispute resolution processes available
to the labor boards enforcing the NIRA (i.e., mediation, conciliation, and
voluntary arbitration) would now be compelled through the NLRB's new
90 See Madden, supra note 89, at 243-44; see also infra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text.
91 E. G. Latham, Legislative Purpose and Administrative Policy Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 433, app. at 471 (1936) (emphasis added).
Latham's proposal was rooted in the proposition that in drafting the Wagner Act,
Congress had failed to heed "one of the lessons of previous boards... that each of these
agencies found it necessary to exercise mediatory and conciliatory powers, and did so."
Id. at 471. As Latham underscored, the new NLRB was no exception. "Proof that... [the
NLRB] is settling many of its cases without recourse to the formal machinery set up by
the Act is to be seen in the report by the Board of the number of cases it has succeeded in
compromising." Id. at 469-70 (citing Press Release R-79, NLRB, Settlement of Labor
Disputes effected by the National Labor Relations Board (Jan. 31, 1936)). In proposing
this reform of the Wagner Act, Latham explicitly challenged "the customary objection to
vesting ... conciliatory or informal powers in a labor agency designed to exercise quasi-
judicial powers... [because of perceived] natural incompatibility between conciliatory
and quasi-judicial functions... ." Id. at 472. Latham argues that,
if it were true... that conciliation always involved the making of compromises
outside the law for the sake only of putting employees back to work, the
development of a consistent body of labor law by the National Labor Relations
Board would perhaps be seriously impeded by resort to compromise. But there is
nothing abhorrent about the idea of compromise if the requirements of the law are
not transgressed. Indeed, the law courts themselves afford a conspicuous example of
where informal settlements are encouraged to avoid litigation.
Id.
92 See Feldman, supra note 74, at 197 n.38 (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT
YEARS, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941, 289 (1969)).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
quasi-judicial, adjudicatory enforcement process.93 However, as this Article
suggests, in keeping with the experimental and flexible spirit of the New
Deal's search for "what works," 94 the NLRB was actually left free, under the
language of the Wagner Act (despite the rhetoric of ADR as heterodoxy
voiced in Roosevelt's announcement of the new quasi-adjudicatory power of
the NLRB), to continue to persuade parties, through informal settlement
processes, to comply voluntarily with the Act by reaching facilitated
settlement agreements through mediation and conciliation. As the historical
record shows, the new power to adjudicate compliance with the Act was
resorted to only when settlement processes failed. It was the NLRB's
continued use of ADR processes in complementary concert with the Board's
new, quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers that resulted in the emergence of a
dispute processing continuum under the Wagner Act.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A DISPUTE PROCESSING CONTINUUM IN THE
NLRB
This Article suggests a revised view of ADR in labor law enforcement by
the NLRB under the Wagner Act. The historical record documenting how the
NLRB "disposed" of cases shows that justice was both negotiated and
adjudicated along a dispute processing continuum. 95 That continuum began
with the use of ADR processes such as negotiation, mediation, and
conciliation to enforce the law via settlement agreements or "adjustments." If
this informal phase of the process failed, agents of the Board would process
the case for resolution by a formal decision of the Board, invoking its newly-
acquired, quasi-adjudicatory function. Even during this "formal" phase of the
continuum, the Board could resort to settlement outcomes as an alternative to
reaching formal decisions on the merits of a case, underscoring its flexible
access to ADR processes within its quasi-adjudicatory framework.96 This
Article suggests that the historical narrative about the law enforcement
activities of the NLRB under the Wagner Act should be revised accordingly,
moving beyond that narrative's view of ADR as heterodoxy.
93 Feldman explains that one view of "the Wagner Act... was [as] a successful
response to a distortion of liberal society caused by the overwhelming growth of big
business and its abuse of its power." Id. at 210.
94 Id. at 209 (suggesting that the Wagner Act can be seen "as the vindication of the
non-ideological, pragmatic, and flexible nature of the American system, much as the
whole of the New Deal can be seen as a particularly American search for 'what works"').
95 See generally Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR, supra note 2.
96 See infra Figures 4 & 5.
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A. Beyond ADR as Heterodoxy: Justice Negotiated
It is significant that the members of the new NLRB (and the agents it
inherited from its predecessor boards) had experience with the use of ADR to
resolve labor law enforcement cases. NLRB Chairman J. Warren Madden,
who had formerly been a Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh,
had once served as a labor arbitrator.97 His fellow Board member, John M.
Carmody, had been formerly a member of the National Mediation Board,
which was the body charged with administering the labor relations provisions
of the Railway Labor Act.98 The third member of the new NLRB, Edwin S.
Smith, had been a member of the First NLRB and also a one-time
Commissioner of Labor and Industries for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. 99 Therefore, prior to the creation of the new NLRB, both
Edwin Smith and John Carmody had been recently involved in the use of
mediation to enforce the Federal Government's labor-relations policies
through settlement agreements.' 00 This experience with mediation shaped
their view of how the Wagner Act, in practice, should be enforced by the
NLRB, notwithstanding its rule-based policy directives reflecting the
Congressional mandate that the new Board should be a "rigorous law
enforcement operation rather than a mediation or conciliation operation." 101
One of John Carmody's contemporaries has suggested, as a matter of
historical record, that Carmody "was committed by his experience to the
mediation approach and... 'was not particularly sympathetic to what he
regarded as a lot of legal rigmarole."" 10 2 In the face of mounting practical
challenges to the NLRB's law enforcement activities and its litigation
strategy for testing the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, Edwin Smith
97 See Madden, supra note 89, at 241.
98 Madden, supra note 53, at 180-81; see supra note 15.
99 Madden, supra note 89, at 238.
100 Madden, supra note 53, at 180-81.
101 GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8,
at 204 (quoting Minutes of a Conference of Regional Directors, June 19, 1936 (on file at
the National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., RG233, Box 157)). In
September 1935, the NLRB informed its regional directors and office staff "not to
attempt mediation or conciliation without direct authorization from the board." Id. at 158
(citing NLRB Files, Instructions to Staff Members, Sept. 17, 1935, at 21, and
Memorandum from E. M. Herrick to office staff, Sept. 25, 1935).
102 GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8,
at 155 (quoting Oral History interview with Philip Levy, Mar. 15, 1969 (on file in the
Labor Management Document Center, New York School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York)).
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advised the NLRB's Regional Directors in mid-1936 that "since the NLRB
planned to 'take relatively few manufacturing cases... to a hearing and
decision' mediation was 'the most important job before the regional director'
and that they should be 'perfectly frank' in telling workers that 'the most we
can do for them is likely to be through mediation."'' 103
To aid its enforcement mission, the new NLRB developed an extensive
bureaucracy. 1°4 In its Washington, D.C., office, it created five separate
divisions: legal, administrative, trial examiner, economic, and publications.
The legal division, headed by a general counsel, took charge of the "legal
work involved in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act." 10 5
This included "supervision over the legal work of the regional attorneys in
the field." 106
The legal division of the NLRB consisted of two subdivisions: litigation
and review. The litigation section was "headed by an associate general
counsel [and was] responsible for the conduct of hearings before the
Board."'1 7 It advised "the regional attorneys in their conduct of hearings
before the agents of the Board in the field [and] represent[ed] the Board in
judicial proceedings seeking to enjoin the Board from holding hearings and
taking other action in cases before it."' 10 8 It also prepared "briefs for
presentation to the courts in all judicial proceedings brought by or against"
the Board. 109 The NLRB's Review Section assisted with the analysis of
103 Id. at 204 (quoting Minutes of a Conference of Regional Directors, June 19,
1936, supra note 101).
104 When it commenced operations, the NLRB had a staff of 50 people in its
Washington office, 13 of which were lawyers. It employed 69 people in the various field
offices, 20 of whom were regional directors, one being a lawyer and 16 case
"examiners." These regional offices also had a support staff of 32. See GROSS, THE
MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 8, at 167 n.79. By
1939, the Board's legal staff had increased substantially, consisting of 91 review
attorneys. Id. at 170 n.88. Professor Gross has observed that "the essentially non
legalistic mediatory approach of the NLB and of the [first] NLRB left the new board on
September 1, 1935, with only" 14 lawyers and, as a result, rendered it "poorly equipped
at the outset to implement its new quasi-judicial role." Id. at 167. However, as this Article
suggests, the continued use of informal methods of dispute resolution to enforce the
Wagner Act via settlement outcomes remained constant well beyond the NLRB's first
years and the eventual augmentation of its legal staff.
105 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 14.
106 Id. at 15.
107 Id. at 14.
108 Id. at 14-15. The "Review Section" was headed by an assistant general counsel.
109 Id. at 15.
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"records of hearings in the regions and before the Board in Washington."" I0
In addition, the Review Section gave the Board opinions and advice on
"general questions of law and problems of interpretation of the act and [on]
the Board's rules and regulations.""'i  In response to inquiries from the
regional offices, the Review Section provided the regional attorneys with
"opinions on the interpretation of the act as applied to specific facts. ' 112 A
Trial Examiners Division engaged in quasi-judicial functions such as holding
hearings "on behalf of the Board."' 1 3 Its members also presided over
"hearings on formal complaints and petitions for certification of
representatives, to make rulings on motions, to prepare intermediate reports
containing findings of fact and recommendations for submission to the
parties, and to prepare informal reports to the Board."'' 14
Notwithstanding all of this quasi-judicial apparatus, however, and
despite the rhetoric of adjudication as orthodoxy, the staff or agents of the
NLRB often resorted to informal, non-adjudicatory methods of resolving
cases filed with the NLRB in order to reach settlement agreements or
"adjustments.""l 5 The NLRB's continued use of ADR processes employed
by prior boards had been presaged by Secretary Perkins in her testimony
before Congress during its hearings on the Wagner bill:
[T]he National Labor Relations Board... is bound more and more to
infringe upon the field of conciliation. Sooner or later, not only the Board
itself, but it will be found some of its subordinates will be engaged in
conciliation, because of the fact there are strikes which should never come
before the Board because they do not involve the defining and interpreting
of 7(a), but where perhaps there is a dispute due to a misunderstanding, and
there should be a conciliatory effort to settle the case without making an
issue or bringing it before the Board.
Whoever touches a case like that will be bound to realize that
conciliation is what should be done, and if this Board itself begins to engage
in conciliation, there will be confusion between conciliation processes and
the judicial processes. It is a very embarrassing thing for a board to find
itself in a position where in one case, just to get the parties back to work, it
has agreed to a principle in conciliation, which as a judicial board
interpreting the law it would not think of endorsing.
110 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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The Board itself, I assume, would never engage in conciliation, but
more and more the subordinates are bound to do that, and there will be built
up, I fear, a duplication of the conciliation service of the Department of
Labor or a transference of the same to the Labor Board. 116
Secretary Perkins' projection of how the NLRB would actually work, in
practice, proved to be accurate. However, as previously mentioned, not only
were her concerns about the NLRB's use of ADR not universally held, but
neither were her concerns about the NLRB's duplication of dispute
resolution functions practiced by the Department of Labor's conciliation
service. Nevertheless, she proposed an amendment of the Wagner bill to
Congress to prevent the duplication of Department of Labor functions by the
NLRB. 117 In the same Congressional hearings, Francis Biddle, Chairman of
the First NLRB, strongly opposed Secretary Perkins' proposed amendment,
stating:
I do not believe the very important questions of policy involved can be
settled only by consideration of general administrative convenience, or
should be determined by fears that the creation of an independent agency
would in the future lead to possible duplication of governmental work. I
wish to say also that all my observations are made from the long-range
point of view.
... It seems to us that if-as is provided in the amendments offered by
the Secretary-the employees and agents of the National Board and any
regional boards set up by it are appointed subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Labor and the Department of Labor, and the Board is subject to
the budgetary control of the Department, the machinery cannot be
considered either impartial or independent.
The National Labor Relations Board, as set up by Executive order of
June 29, 1934, though it was directed to make its reports to the President
through the Secretary of Labor, and directed not to duplicate the mediatory
and statistical work of the Department, has nevertheless been, in its
administration of section 7(a), and in its control of its own personnel and
116 1 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1437 (statement of
Frances Perkins).
117 One clause in that version of the bill read:
The Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies, and
utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, and such agencies provided for
by agreement, code, or law. But nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize
the Board to appoint persons to engage in mediation, conciliation, or statistical
work, when the services of such person may be obtained from other bureaus or
divisions in the Department of Labor, as may from time to time be needed.
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1444 (emphasis added).
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expenditures an agency independent of the Department. This independence
has not resulted in the duplication of work which the Secretary fears as like
to result from Senator Wagner's bill as now drafted. The Board has taken
pains not to encroach upon the work of the conciliation service of the
Department. It has proceeded under a harmonious working arrangement
with the Department, specifying the respective functions of the Board and
the Department. To make it abundantly clear that there shall be no
duplication of work the Board is entirely agreeable to the insertion in the
bill of a provision forbidding the Board to appoint persons to engage in
mediation, conciliation, or statistical work, when the services of such
persons may be obtained from the Department of Labor. A similar provision
in section l(b) of the Executive order under which we now operate has
proven entirely satisfactory. 1 18
Biddle's testimony before Congress went on to suggest that the "danger"
in transferring functions of the Board to the Department of Labor could be
illustrated by reference to one section of the Wagner bill as "reported out of
committee" in the prior year. 119 That section would have made review of
complaints by the Department of Labor a prerequisite to the processing of a
case by the NLRB. 120 In Biddle's view, such a procedural and jurisdictional
overlap between the NLRB and the Department of Labor would have
allowed the Department to intrude on labor law enforcement matters and
establish norms for settlement that were inconsistent with those governing
the law enforcement function of Biddle's board. Biddle directed Congress'
critical attention to the language in the earlier version of the bill that would
have made the new board dependent upon the Department of Labor in the
manner he described. 12 1 It stated:
"[W]henever the Secretary of Labor shall notify the Board that there is
reasonable cause to believe" that an unfair labor practice has been
committe[d] .... [T]he Board would usually act "only when a case is drawn
to its attention by the Secretary of Labor (who through the conciliation
service of the Department of Labor will presumably first utilize every
appropriate means for a voluntary adjustment of the matter)." The Board
would thus not exercise any control over the complaints at the initial stage,
though the very nature of the complaint calls for enforcement of the law
rather than the compromising which is characteristic of the conciliator's
function. In other words, a man has been fired on account of union activity
118 Id. 1461-64 (statement of Francis Biddle) (emphasis added).
19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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and he wants to file his complaint in a court, and not to have the matter
conciliated.
The Board would have no control, of course, over the actions of the
conciliators, and the compromise they might undertake to negotiate, and the
legal interpretations upon which they might presume to act. The right to file
a complaint of a violation of the law would rest upon the personal decision
of the Secretary, rather than on the determination of the judicial body
provided by the act for the enforcement of such right; and such decision by
some future Secretary might well be tinged by considerations outside of the
merits of the case .... 122
In its final form, the language of the Wagner Act adopted Biddle's
proposed language about the NLRB's use of mediation and conciliation. In
as much, the Act did seek to avert overlap between the jurisdictions of the
new Board and the mediation and conciliation services of the Department of
Labor. It did not, however, bar the NLRB from using mediation or
conciliation within its law enforcement framework to settle or "adjust" cases
that were within its own exclusive jurisdiction, and that were, therefore,
outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and its conciliation and
mediation services. The operative provision read as follows:
The Board shall appoint, without regard for the provisions of the civil-
service laws but subject to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, an
executive secretary, and such attorneys, examiners, and regional directors,
and shall appoint such other employees with regard to existing laws
applicable to the employment and compensation of officers and employees
of the United States, as it may from time to time find necessary for the
proper performance of its duties and as may be from time to time
appropriated for by Congress. The Board may establish or utilize such
regional, local, or other agencies, and utilize such voluntary and
uncompensated services, as may from time to time be needed.... Nothing
in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals
for the purpose of conciliation or mediation (or for statistical work), where
such service may be obtainedfrom the Department of Labor. 123
122 Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).
123 S. 1958, 74th Cong. § 4(a) (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, 3272 (1949) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA]. Wagner's own version of this section of the bill as
introduced to the Senate on February 15, 1935, before final amendment and passage, read
as follows:
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Another clause in the Act underscored the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board
over unfair labor practices, stating that it could "not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention than has been or may be established by
agreement, code, law, or otherwise."1 24 Thus, the new NLRB had jurisdiction
over all cases from the start, as a matter of first impression, without prior
screening by the Department of Labor or any other governmental agency or
department. This enabled the NLRB to conduct its own settlement processes
in matters of its exclusive jurisdiction without, as Francis Biddle suggested,
"encroach[ing] upon the conciliatory [or mediatory] service of the
Department [of Labor]."'1 25 As a result, the NLRB's use of settlement
processes was consistent with the Wagner Act's intent to protect the separate
jurisdictions of the NLRB and the Department of Labor, while
simultaneously facilitating the emergence of a dispute processing continuum
within the NLRB's quasi-adjudicatory law enforcement framework under the
Act.
This Article suggests, therefore, that, as a matter of rule-based
interpretation, the statutory clause, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or
mediation (or for statistical work), where such service may be obtained from
the Department of Labor," did not prohibit the NLRB from using ADR
practices as part of its own process for adjusting cases that were within its
exclusive jurisdiction, enabling it alone to facilitate the negotiation of
settlement terms that it deemed to be in keeping with the legal parameters of
the Wagner Act. 126
The Board shall appoint such employees, and, without regard for the provisions
of the civil-service laws or the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, appoint and
fix the compensation of an executive secretary, assistant executive secretaries, and
such attorneys, special experts, examiners, and regional directors, as it may from
time to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties and as may be
from time to time appropriated by Congress. The Board may establish or utilize such
regional, local, or other agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated
services as may from time to time be needed.
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1379.
124 S. 1958, 74th Cong. § 10(a) (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NLRA, supra note 123, at 3275.
125 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 16, at 1469 (statement of
Francis Biddle).
126 The historical record reveals that internal NLRB directives contemplated the
continued use of mediation and conciliation by regional directors, with prior approval of
the Washington office, as part of the new Board's law enforcement operation. See supra
note 101 (quoting NLRB directives from September 1935, instructing regional directors
and office staff "not to attempt mediation or conciliation without direct authorization
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Consequently, the new NLRB was left at liberty by the language of the
Wagner Act to devise and effectuate its own dispute processing continuum
along which it could opt to facilitate the negotiation of settlement outcomes
via mediation and conciliation or adjudicate formal decisions, on a case by
case basis, without intervention by the Department of Labor, at preliminary
or later stages in its processing of a case. The processual evidence
documenting the Board's settlement activities supports these conclusions. 27
The case management records of the NLRB show that the Board achieved a
settlement rate of approximately 45% during its first year, and over 60% in
its second year, evidencing its liberal resort to informal dispute resolutions
functions to "settle," "adjust," or "compose" cases. 128
from the board"). The Regional Directors of the NLRB at first resisted the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Board to create a framework for the Board's new
formalized, quasi-judicial powers, because they preferred the mediation-intensive focus
of the law enforcement operations of the First NLRB and the National Labor Board that
preceded it. See GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra
note 8, at 159. They also felt that rule-based restrictions on their previous activities and
responsibilities "demonstrated little understanding of 'what actually goes on in the field
offices dealing with problems."' Id. at 160 (quoting Oral History Interview with George
Pratt (Mar. 18, 1970) (manuscript at 80-81, on file with Labor Management
Documentation Center, New York School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell,
Ithaca, New York)). As this Article suggests, the continued use of ADR practices by
these regional directors and their staffs, as a matter of processual reality, led to the
emergence of the dispute processing continuum under the Wagner Act. Although
Congress did not take steps to "regularize" this use of ADR during this period, the use of
ADR processes became institutionalized in practice (that is, processually) after the
Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act.
127 See supra note 11, discussing the processual and rule-centered approaches to
legal history. It was perhaps owing to the processual workings of the NLRB that it was
perceived by many of its contemporaries as engaging in ADR processes, instead of solely
quasi-adjudication. On the other hand, it was in part owing to its rule-based
characterizations by President Roosevelt and others, as a quasi-judicial board and not a
mediation board, that history has characterized the NLRB as an adjudicatory Board,
rather than one which also called upon the informal processes of negotiation, mediation,
and conciliation to enforce the law.
128 See 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 35, Table IV (45% of all cases were
disposed of by settlement before issuance of a formal complaint and 35.2% after,
resulting in a 44.9% settlement rate for the first year); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1937),
Table I, reprinted in 1 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 30 (60.9% of all cases were settled
prior to the issuance of a complaint and for the entire second year of operations). The
terms "settle," "adjust," and "compose" (or their grammatical variants) are used
interchangeably in the annual records of the NLRB to refer to settlement outcomes, see 1
NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 5 (using the terms "adjust" and "compose," the latter
term being quoted from Exec. Order, Dec. 16, 1933), 35 (using the term "settlement")
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B. Settlement Statistics of the Early NLRB: Bargaining Under the
Shadow of the Law and in the Clear Light of Legal Certainty
The historical documentation of the actual workings of the NLRB after
the passage of the Wagner Act can be characterized as processual, rather
than purely rule-based.129 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the disposition of cases
by the NLRB in its first and second years of practice, along with summary
details of the salient, law-enforcement-related terms of the settlement
agreements reached. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that settlements were reached
at various stages along the NLRB's dispute processing continuum: before the
issuance of a formal complaint, after the issuance of such a complaint, and
before, during, or after a hearing had occurred following the issuance of a
complaint. Thus, settlement agreements were reached, in varying degrees,
either "under the shadow of the law" or in the "clear light of legal
certainty."1 30
and 11 NLRB ANN. REP. 84 (1946), reprinted in 2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ANNUAL REPORTS, 1943-1949 (1985) [hereinafter 2 NLRB REPORTS] (using the term
"adjusted" to refer to cases settled).
129 See supra note 11.
130 See supra note 10 (discussing the distinction between settlement outcomes
reached "under the shadow of the law" and "in the clear light of legal certainty").
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Figure 2
Disposition of Cases by the NLRB 1935-36*
Number of Number of Workers
Cases Involved
By Withdrawal of Charge or Petition 201 65,211
By Petition dismissed before 113 21,781
hearing/refusal to issue complaint
By Transfer or consolidation 19 5,915
By Settlement (nature of settlement listed 331 40,358
directly below)
P Recognition of workers' 108 17,990
representatives
Reinstatement 91 4,721
Reinstatement and recognition 51 5,738
0 Reinstatement and improved 17 1,973
working conditions
0 Consent election 24 5,610
0 Arbitration 4 439
I Other (abolition of company 36 3,883
unions; agreement to cease
interference with employees'
exercise of freedom of self
organization, posting notices to
this effect, etc.).
By Intermediate finding of no violation 6 306
By issuance of decisions:
0 Cease and desist orders 56 5,514
0 Certifications 6 2,474
I Dismissal of complaints or petitions 5 2,057
0 Refusal to certify 1 700
Injunctions issued restraining Board from 44 27,792
further action
Cases pending 286 68,761
Total 1,068 240,865
Source: 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 30-31 (1936) (Tables I & II).
*Includes unfair labor practice and representation cases
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Figure 3
Disposition of Cases by the NLRB 1936-37*
-
Number of Number of Percentage of Percentage
Cases Workers Total Cases of Cases
Closed
Cases pending June 30, 1936 330 96,553 7.5
Cases received July 1, 1936 -June 30, 1937 4,068 1,398,282 92.5
Total cases handled 4,398 1,494,835 100.0
Before formal action:
by settlement (as follows) 1,429 325,898 32.5 60.9
by recognition of worker's 739 156,388
Representatives
0 by reinstatement 335 22,046- ----------- --------
0 by reinstatement and recognition 46 4,115 --------
0 by reinstatement and improved working 31 5,590- ----------- -------
Conditions
I by consent election 194 127,213---------- -----
I by arbitration 5 5,020- ----------- --------
0 by other (including abolition of company
unions, agreements to cease interference 25 5,526
with employees' exercise of freedom or
right of self-organization, posting notices
to this effect, placement of workers on
preferential lists for employment, cash
settlements of payment of back wages,
increases in wages and improvement of
working conditions)
" by withdrawal of charge or petition 539 73,040 12.2 22.9
" by dismissal of petition or refusal to 254 37,355 5.7 10.8
issue complaint
- by transfer to other agencies 13 3,486 0.3 0.5
After formal action:
" by consolidation 38 0.8 1.6
" by intermediate report finding no 2 21 less than .01 less than .01
violation
* by compliance with intermediate report 6 604 less than .01 0.2
" by dismissal of complaint or petition 5 3,774 less than .01 0.2
" by issuance of decisions or orders:
0 certifications 43 18,249 0.9 1.8
I compliance 3 3,961 less than .01 0.1
I dismissal of complaint or petition 11 1,369 0.2 0.4
I refusal to certify 1 50 less than .01 less than .01
Total cases closed 2,344 467,807 53.3
Cases pending 2,054 1,027,028 46.7
Source: 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 15-17 (1937) (Tables I & II).
*Includes unfair labor practice and representation cases
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In addition to the settlement agreements accounted for in the statistical
data displayed in Figures 2 and 3, the NLRB's first and second annual
reports, submitted by Chairman Madden to the President and Congress,
detailed a segment of settlement activities by the Board that were not
accounted for in the Board's settlement statistics contained in those annual
reports. The reports described these actions taken to "adjust" cases under the
general heading "informal activities":
The regional directors, as a result of their position in the territories within
which they operated, have been frequently consulted by employers and
employees regarding labor relations problems, and have thus been able to
prevent many labor disturbances or violations of the act which might
otherwise have occurred. In addition, many labor disputes which never
became formal cases have been adjusted by the regional directors.
Sometimes this necessitated nothing more than a telephone call, or the
arranging of a conference between the parties. At other times, it involved
persuading the parties to arbitrate their disputes or to accept some other
solution of their problems. In many of the cases disposed of in this manner,
the jurisdiction of the Board was doubtful, and therefore no formal charges
were filed, but the value to the community of a settlement of the dispute
was clear. This work has been an important contribution to the industrial
peace of various regions involved, and has effected considerable savings, in
terms of industrial wealth. No statistical record has been kept of this phase
of the Board's work, and it is not reflected in the [settlement statistics
submitted as part of this report]. 131
As this description of one facet of the Board's informal settlement activities
illustrates, the Board employed ADR processes, such as negotiation,
conciliation, mediation, and even referrals to arbitration, to adjust cases, as
well as screen out those deemed inappropriate for its formal consideration.
In addition to this account of the "informal activities" of the Board, both
the first and second annual reports of the Board contain separate sections
headed "Settlements." These settlement activities involved the Board's use of
ADR processes to "adjust" or resolve cases by informal means that
culminated in formalized settlement agreements. 132 These reports (spanning
1935-37), provide identical descriptions of the incidence of such settlements
as follows:
131 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 32. The same explanation is given in the
Second Annual Report as in the First Annual Report. See 2 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note
128, at 17.
132 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 60.
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Almost 45 percent of all the cases disposed of were closed as a result of
settlement of the disputes involved. Three hundred and thirty-one, being 31
percent of all the cases received, and involving 40,354 employees, were
closed in this manner. In all of these cases, a member of the Board's staff
participated directly in securing the settlement, and the terms of the
settlement were in conformity with the provisions and policy of the act. In
effect, substantial compliance with the act was secured by the settlements in
these cases. 13 3
Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the fact that the Board's role was
touted as being that of a quasi-judicial enforcement agency, it took pains in
these initial annual reports to underscore the necessity, for reasons of
expediency, of its ongoing resort to informal settlement processes akin to
those employed by prior labor boards:
There is no way of avoiding a certain amount of delay in the formal
procedure before the Board and the courts required under the act. The Board
has attempted in every way possible to reduce the time element in the
procedure before it to a minimum, but it has no control over the time which
elapses as a result of the review of its orders by the courts. Therefore the
ability of the regional offices to secure settlements before formal action
became necessary has meant the rapid removal from the area of possible
industrial conflict certain disputes which by their nature are likely to lead to
economic strife. The benefits of such settlements have accrued to the
employers and employees directly involved, as well as to the general public.
There is no need to argue the value of such settlements as alternatives to
strikes or other forms of industrial warfare, with consequent burdens upon
commerce, nor to point out the elimination of economic waste, of privation
and suffering, and of inconvenience and loss, to the public as well as to the
parties directly and indirectly affected, which is achieved by the substitution
of peaceful settlements for strikes. 13 4
The Board's First Annual Report describes, in general terms, the issues
involved and the timing of some of these settlement outcomes:
In some of the settlements secured by the Board during the period ending
June 30, 1936, intervention by the Board took place before the dispute
involved had advanced to the stage of strikes or threatened strikes.
However, the issues in these disputes, discrimination, union recognition and
collective bargaining, were the same issues which have caused a large
percentage of the strikes in the United States for many years, and we may
133 Id. at 31.
134 Id.
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safely assume that a large proportion of these disputes would have resulted
in strikes but for the intervention of the Board. In 72 of the cases in which
settlements were secured, strikes were actually in progress, in 52 cases
strikes had been threatened; in the remaining cases, the disputes had not yet
reached the stage of strike or threatened strike. 13 5
Figures 4 and 5 display the rates of settlement reached at each stage along the
NLRB's dispute processing continuum in 1935-36 and 1937-38,
respectively.
135 Id.
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Figure 4
Stages of Settlement along the NLRB's Dispute Processing Continuum
1935-36*
Number Number Percentage Percentage of
of Cases of of Total Cases in
Workers Cases Category
Cases disposed of before issuance of
complaint:
" by settlement 240 25,966 27.8 45.2
" by withdrawal of charge 168 37,772 19.4 31.6
" by refusal to issue complaint 108 15,681 12.5 20.3
" by transfer 13 1,779 1.5 2.5
" by consolidation 2 1 0.2 0.4
TOTAL: disposed of before issuance 531 81,199 61.4 100.0
of complaint
Cases disposed of after issuances of
complaint:
" by settlement before hearing 18 1,365 2.1 17.1
" by settlement during hearing 6 98 0.7 5.7
* by settlement after hearing 13 2,119 1.5 12.4
" by dismissal after hearing by Board 9 2,199 1.0 8.6
or trial examiners
- by withdrawal of charge after 3 231 0.3 2.9
hearing
- by cease-and-desist orders issued 56 5,514 6.5 53.3
by the Board
TOTAL disposed of after issuance of 105 11,526 12.1 100.0
complaint:
Cases pending-
* hearings to be held 135 36,725 15.6 58.9
" hearings prevented by injunction 30 17,487 3.5 13.1
" decisions of Board pending 48 11,934 5.5 21.0
" intermediate reports pending 16 1,475 1.9 7.9
TOTAL cases pending- 229 67,621 26.5 100.0
TOTAL COMPLAINT CASES 865 160,346 100.0
Source: 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 35 (1936) (Table IV).
*Includes unfair labor practice cases only
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Figure 5
Stages of Settlement along the NLRB's Dispute Processing Continuum
1936-37*
Number Number Percentage Percentage of
of Cases of of Total Cases in
Workers Cases Category
Cases disposed of before issuance
of complaint:
" by settlement 1,003 147,596 32.1 60.1
" by withdrawal of charge 422 55,734 13.5 25.3
" by refusal to issue complaint 234 26,309 7.4 14.0
" by transfer 9 2,626 0.2 less than .01
TOTAL: disposed of before 1,668 232,265 53.6 100.0
issuance of compliance
Cases disposed of after issuances
of complaint:
" by consolidation 31 less than .01 33.0
" by settlement before hearing 15 972 less than .01 16.0
" by settlement during hearing 11 907 less than .01 11.7
" by settlement after hearing 15 8,979 less than .01 16.0
* by dismissal after hearing by 8 850 less than .01 8.5
Board or trial examiners
- by withdrawal of charge after 3 1,327 less than .01 3.1
hearing
- by intermediate report finding 2 21 less than .01 2.1
no violation
- by compliance with 6 604 less than .01 6.4
intermediate report
- by compliance with decision of 3 3,961 less than .01 3.1
court order
TOTAL disposed of after 94 17,621 3.0 100.0
issuance of complaint:
Cases pending:
* before hearing 1,276 662,880 40.8 93.6
* after hearing:
awaiting intermediate report 19
0 awaiting decision 31
, awaiting compliance with cease 36
and desist orders
awaiting intermediate report 19 8,796 less than .01 1.4
awaiting decision 31 8,689 less than .01 2.3
awaiting compliance with 36 14,335 1.0 2.6
cease and desist orders
TOTAL cases pending: 1,362 694,720 43.6 100.0
TOTAL COMPLAINT CASES 3,124 944,606 100.0
Source: 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1937) (Table IV).
* Includes unfair labor practice cases only
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In 1937, towards the end of the NLRB's second year of operation, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.136 As the New York Times reported, because
the NLRB had been "putting off consideration of many types of complaints
in view of the imminence of court rulings," it was now expected that unions
would press the NLRB "for action."'137 However, when the New York Times
reporter asked NLRB Chairman Madden if he expected increased business
by the Board as a result of the decision, Madden responded, "No, the
reverse.... Our regional directors will be able to adjust matters very
well." 138 Madden was clearly comfortable with the public acknowledgement
that the NLRB would continue to use ADR processes to reach settlement
outcomes as part of its law enforcement practices. Indeed, prior to Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., Madden wrote a short essay describing the institutional
history of the Board and its use of settlement as an alternative to adjudicated
outcomes in a significant percentage of the Board's law enforcement-related
dispute resolution activity139:
The National Labor Relations Act [Wagner Act] . .. passed by the 74th
Congress and signed by the President on July 5, 1935, establishes a Board
of three members who shall act as an independent agency of the
Government to carry out the intention of Congress that American workers
shall have the right to organize and select representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining with their employers.
We began to function in late August of this year [1935].... The Board to
date (November 12, 1935) has taken two cases under its own jurisdiction.
... In the regional offices a dozen additional cases have been set for
preliminary hearing.... In the face of an increasingly steady docket, it is a
satisfaction to be able also to report that settlements in cases involving
unfair labor practices have been made in several instances... the result
being peaceful solutions of what had threatened to be disturbing
situations. 
14 0
Twenty-five years after the passage of the Wagner Act, Madden wrote a law
review article describing the law enforcement functions of the Board under
136 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
137 Louis Stark, Labor Will Drive for a New Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 1.
138 Id.
139 See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 254 (1982) (quoting Thomas
Emerson, Columbia Oral History Collection, Columbia University Library, New York).
140 Madden, supra note 53, at 179-81 (emphasis added).
669
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
his Chairmanship (spanning 1935-40). In that description he made reference
to the Board's complementary use of ADR and adjudication:
The Board and its staff went about administering the law as if it were the
law. Charges of violations were numerous. They were investigated with
care. A considerable proportion of them seemed to have merit, and were
scheduled for formal hearings. Many of them seemed to have no merit and
were dismissed. The staffpeople in the field did a good deal of conciliating,
persuading employers to redress alleged grievances which they did not
admit, but which they were not unwilling to redress. Some hearings were
prevented by injunctions of state or federal courts, but that problem was
solved by decisions that one had to submit to the administrative procedures
before he could litigate the question of validity of the statute as applied to
his case. 141
Chairman Madden thus clearly saw it within the Board's rule-based
power to enforce the legal requirements of the Wagner Act through non-
adjudicatory processes that resulted in settlement agreements. This use of
ADR to enforce labor law under the Wagner Act relieved the NLRB of the
mechanical need to resort to formal hearings and issue orders in all cases.
Thus, the use of ADR enabled the Board to resolve many of its bona fide
cases flexibly, expeditiously, and consensually through these settlement
agreements, rather than being compelled to delay resolution or prevention of
industrial strife by having to process all of its cases through its adjudicatory
machinery and, in some cases, court enforcement procedures.
142
After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act,
Chairman Madden's prognostications about the increased settlement
activities of the regional boards proved accurate: the regional offices
succeeded in adjusting, through informal dispute settlement means, a
significant number of the cases brought before the Board. As Figure 6
illustrates, the rates of settlement by the NLRB remained constant, though
the number of cases settled increased in proportion to the total number filed.
141 Madden, supra note 89, at 243-44 (emphasis added).
142 See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Figure 6
Settlement/Adjustment Statistics
National Labor Relations Board 1935-47
Total cases settled or Percentage of
"adjusted" all cases
disposed of
__________________during period
Under the Wagner Act*
1935-1936
331 44.9
1936-1937 1,429 60.9
1937-1938 4,609 52.1
1938-1939 3,069 46.8
1939-1940 2,888 39.3
1940-1941 4,211 50.1
1941-1942 5,968 50.8
1942-1943 4,592 47.0
1943-1944 3,770 41.0
1944-1945 3,673 40.0
1945-1946 4,622 42.0
1946-1947 6,513 45.0
After the Taft-Hartley Act**
1947-1948 20,233 69.0
1948-1949 21,845 67.0
Sources: 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 30 (1936); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1937); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1938); 4
NLRB ANN. REP. 19 (1939); 5 NLRB ANN. REP 20 (1940); 6 NLRB ANN. REP. 25 (1941) (Table 7); 7
NLRB ANN. REP 81 (1942) (Table 8); 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 91-92 (1943) (Tables 8 & 9); 9 NLRB ANN.
REP. 82-83 (1944) (Tables 7 & 8); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 84-85 (1945) (Tables 7 & 8); 11 NLRB ANN. REP.
79-80 (1946) (Tables 8 & 9); 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 71-72 (1947) (Tables 7 & 8); 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 104-
106 (1948) (Tables 7-9); 14NLRB ANN. REP. 164-66 (1949) (Tables 7-9).
* Includes unfair labor practice and representation cases
** Includes unfair labor practice, representation, and union-shop authorization cases
Each annual report from the Board's first five years of operation (1935-
40) records a high rate of settlement and contains some variation of the
following statement:
The Board has attempted in every way possible to reduce to a minimum the
time elapsing between the initiation and the closing of a case before it. To
that end, it has encouraged the effectuation of settlements without recourse
to formal Board procedure. The ability of the regional director to secure
settlements without recourse to formal Board decisions and orders has
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meant the rapid removal from the area of possible industrial conflict of
disputes which, by their nature, are likely to lead to economic strife. 14 3
The Sixth Annual Report, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, again
referred to the Board's continued settlement practices, this time describing
the closure of cases by "amicable adjustment in the form of settlement
agreements."'144 That report also referred to the involvement in some cases of
other governmental agencies whose sole focus was the mediation and
conciliation of labor disputes. 145 This increased governmental effort to
resolve labor disputes through ADR was occasioned by the mounting labor
tensions in the defense industry leading up to the United States' entrance into
World War II:
The tension which has pervaded the field of labor relations during the last
year has been apparent to the Board since the middle of the fiscal year. Over
50 percent of the cases on its docket involve defense industries. Practically
all the representation cases handled either formally or informally represent
issues which demand the most expeditious handling because of threatened
stoppages in defense production. This is true also of a substantial number of
the complaint cases where it has not been possible for any of the mediation
or conciliation agencies of the Government or of the Board's field staff to
secure an amicable and satisfactory adjustment despite the fact that such
cases result in stoppages or prevent collective bargaining. 146
In this report, the Board was at pains to explain that the jurisdictional overlap
that was occurring between it and other agencies would not result in the
usurpation of the Board's exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the
legal requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. It made it clear that
where the "statutory rights of the workers [were] involved," such rights
would not be resolved through mediation by any other agency of the
government, but only through "decisions" or "satisfactory settlements"
reached by the NLRB itself:
143 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1939), reprinted in 1 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 30;
accord 1 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 30, at 31; 2 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 128, at
16; 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 21 (1938), reprinted in 1 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 30.
144 6 NLRB ANN. REP. 26 (1941), reprinted in I NLRB REPORTS, supra note 30; see
also id. at 14 ("About 50% of all cases closed in 1941 ... were closed by agreement
between the parties involved.").
145 Id. at 3.
146 Id. (emphasis added).
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In dealing with disputes in defense industries the Board has cooperated fully
with other Governmental agencies. Problems involving the rights of
employees to self-organization and to bargain collectively have cut across
many disputes threatening or actually tying up defense production which
have engaged the attention of the Conciliation Service of the Department of
Labor, the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management, and the
National Defense Mediation Board. Since these agencies operate to mediate
disputes and do not adjudicate statutory rights, the existence of claims under
the National Labor Relations Act has been recognized as calling for close
collaboration with the Board in its handling of such disputes. Thus there are
many cases where mediation of a dispute over working conditions must
await the investigation by the National Labor Relations Board under section
9, or where the investigation to determine whether the union claiming to
represent the workers really does so in the contemplation of the Act, must
await adjudication of unfair labor practice charges. In cases where the
statutory rights of the workers are involved, the mediation agencies
cooperate with and assist the Board to arrive at prompt decisions or
satisfactory settlements. Mediation of statutory rights has not been resorted
to. 147
Thus, during this intense period of agency overlap, the NLRB did not
relinquish its use of ADR to other agencies or delegate to them the power to
resolve, by settlement agreements, issues in cases that concerned questions of
law under the Wagner Act, and that, therefore, remained within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board.
Indeed, the statistical components of the Sixth Annual Report reflecting
the increased rate of cases settled by the NLRB during that year, from 39.3%
during its fifth year of operation to 50.1% during its sixth,148 underscores the
Board's heightened preference for using ADR along the dispute processing
continuum that emerged, and had by now become institutionalized, within its
law enforcement framework. As that report states:
During the fiscal year a substantial reorganization has been undertaken and
some changes in procedures inaugurated.... The previously existing
delegation of authority by the Board to staff members to dispose of cases by
informal adjustment and to authorize formal proceedings has been
broadened and deepened, and, in line with the recommendations of the
Attorney General's Committee Report, only cases involving perplexing and
novel issues of law or procedure are now brought to the Board for guidance
in the administrative phases. This has resulted in freeing a greater
147 Id.
148 See supra Figure 6.
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proportion of the Board's time for deciding formal cases on the record, and
for considering policy problems. 149
During World War II (also referred to herein as "WWII"), the War Labor
Board was established to resolve labor disputes. The NLRB's Eighth Annual
Report refers to some aspects of the War Labor Board's jurisdiction, as well
as the separate jurisdiction of the Department of Labor's Conciliation
Service, and the continued centrality of the NLRB's role in the resolution of
disputes concerning statutory rights under the Wagner Act:
The tremendous impact of the war upon American industry has created a
number of new problems in industrial relations, in the solution of which the
Wagner Act has become of increasing importance. For the full and effective
use of resources in the production necessary for the successful prosecution
of the war, the principal Federal statute [i.e. the Wagner Act] defining the
rights of employees and providing a forum, integrated with the courts, for
the adjudication of controversies over these rights [i.e. the NLRB], has
played an essential role .... [T]he tensions incident to these abnormal
economic conditions have made it more essential than ever that agencies of
Government should be utilized to eliminate the sources of friction and poor
morale which could develop into serious interruptions of production....
[Disputes related to] ... the elimination of unfair labor practices which
impede the acceptance of sound collective bargaining practices... [and
those involving] the prompt determination of disputes as to the choice of
bargaining agents by employees... [raise] organizational questions [within
the Board's jurisdiction].... After these controversies have been resolved
and collective bargaining established, it has been the province of the
Conciliation Service to assist the parties in working out substantive
agreements for wages and other working conditions. When an impasse
develops in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, the War
Labor Board has been vested with the duty of issuing decisions with respect
to the substantive questions at issue, which are binding on the parties. 150
Therefore, the NLRB retained jurisdiction over the substantive matters
covered by the Wagner Act and continued to use informal and formal
processes to resolve those matters independent of the increased, wartime
involvement of other governmental agencies whose province was to help
maintain harmony between the parties after the NLRB had resolved matters
that fell within the purview of the Wagner Act. The Ninth Annual Report of
149 4 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 143, at 3-4.
150 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 1-2 (1943), reprinted in 2 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 128
(emphasis added).
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the NLRB, for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1944, discussed, with
increased transparency, the importance of the Board's continued and, by
now, increased use of "informal" methods of dispute resolution:
The Board's overwhelming preoccupation with cases involving vital
war operations continues to be demonstrated by the frequency with which
the Board's services are invoked in certain industries.... Operating as it
does in a field of dynamic relationships, the Board faces a constant
challenge to maintain its procedures apace with the demands placed upon it.
Consequently, the Board has devised and augmented certain administrative
and informal procedures which are designed to facilitate the resolution of
questions as to union majority status and the prevention and remedy of
unfair labor practices. For example, the Board's administrative procedures,
in effect, operate as a sifting process: securing ... the adjustment of those
cases with merit by the parties and in accord with the policies of the Act.
Thus, of 34,879 charges of unfair labor practice filed with the Board since
1935, only 2,462, or 7 percent, have gone as far as formal Board decisions.
Furthermore, the Board encourages resort to its so-called "consent"
arrangements. Under these procedures the parties themselves agree on the
manner of disposition of cases, fully meeting the requirements of the law,
and utilize the Board's personnel and machinery to do so. Thus, of the
31,222 petitions for investigation and certification of representatives
handled by the Board since its inception, 16,592, or 53 percent, were based
on the full agreement of all parties, thereby dispensing with any formal
hearings and determinations by the Board.
The Board endorses and stresses the use of such informal procedures
for the achievement of results consistent with national policy. They save
parties and the Government the expense of formal hearings. They lead to
the speedy resolution of questions of employee representation which
impede or obstruct the course of collective bargaining. They hasten the
removal and correction of practices which are contrary to law. Above all,
the Board's experience has been that collective bargaining relations
between employer and employees in a particular plant are more likely to
develop if the charges of unfair labor practices are disposed of in an
informal manner freely accepted by them, without recourse to formal
procedures. The use of such informal procedures has been characterized as
"the life-blood of the administrative process."... The Board has devised,
and makes available to the parties, several types of procedures through
which representation disputes can be resolved without recourse to formal
procedures. 15 1
151 9 NLRB Ann. Rep. 7-9 (1944), reprinted in 2 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 128
(emphasis added). Some of the "new" procedures for effecting settlement outcomes are
named and defined in this report. In representation cases, they are the "consent cross-
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Clearly, in addition to the interventions by Board staff and officials that had
become institutionalized through consistent practice since the Board's
inception, involving the use of ADR processes such as negotiation,
mediation, and conciliation, the Board had, over time, devised other
"procedures" for processing cases informally that also became part of its
regularized framework for reaching settlement outcomes. This evolution of
new settlement devices indicates that the agents of the NLRB exercised
creativity and flexibility in designing such mechanisms to assist with the
settlement processes.
By the Board's tenth year of operations, the Supreme Court, in the case
of Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board,1 52 took judicial
notice of the NLRB's high rate of settling cases: "50% of all cases before it
have been adjusted under its supervision."'153 The Court also described,
unabashedly and with clear approval, the NLRB's use, since its inception, of
informal settlement practices as a means of enforcing the law through ADR
without taking recourse in all cases to the more costly and time-consuming
adjudicatory process. 154 In Wallace, the Court not only legitimated the
NLRB's use of such settlement processes, but gave full force of law to its
manner of implementing settlement agreements by upholding the Board's
self-designed practice of using its quasi-adjudicatory powers, in conjunction
with courts, to take corrective action when the agreements were breached or
otherwise proved ineffective:
To prevent disputes like the one here involved, the Board has from the very
beginning encouraged compromises and settlements. [] The purpose of such
attempted settlements has been to end labor disputes, and so far as possible
to extinguish all the elements giving rise to them. The attempted settlement
here wholly failed to prevent the wholesale discard of employees as a result
of their union affiliations. The purpose of the settlement was thereby
defeated. Upon this failure, when the Board's further action was properly
invoked, it became its duty to take fresh steps to prevent frustration of the
Act. To meet such situations the Board has established as a working rule
the principle that it ordinarily will respect the terms of a settlement
check," the "consent election," the "stipulated cross-check," and the "stipulation
election." Id. at 9-11. In unfair labor practice cases, they include the use of "Board-
prepared forms" for the settlement agreement and "printed notices for posting by the
employer" in cases that settle before reaching the stage of a Board hearing, and
settlement stipulations in cases that settle after the commencement of a hearing. Id. at 13-
14.
152 Wallace Corporation v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
153 Id. at 254 n.8.
154 See infra text accompanying note 155.
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agreement approved by it. [] It has consistently gone behind such
agreements, however, where subsequent events have demonstrated that
efforts at adjustment have failed to accomplish their purpose, or where
there has been a subsequent unfair labor practice. [] We think this rule
adopted by the Board is appropriate to accomplish the Act's purpose with
fairness to all concerned. Consequently, since the Board correctly found
that there was a subsequent unfair labor practice, it was justified in
considering evidence as to petitioner's conduct, both before and after the
settlement and certification. 15 5
Thus, notwithstanding the rhetoric of ADR as heterodoxy that ushered in the
adjudicatory function of the new NLRB under the Wagner Act in 1935, by
1944 the Supreme Court's laudatory description of the NLRB's settlement
activities underscored the primacy and prevalence of ADR practices in the
NLRB's law enforcement activities since its inception.
It was, perhaps for this reason, that the Board's Tenth Annual Report,
written after the end of World War II, and following the Supreme Court's
decision in Wallace, provided more descriptive details about the nature of its
settlement outcomes in unfair labor practice claims:
The Board closed 2,308 unfair labor practice cases during the year [1944-
45]. Eighty-seven and sixth-tenths percent of them were handled informally,
without recourse to formal hearing and written decisions. The remedies in
the cases closed by settlement or by compliance with Intermediate Report,
Board order, or court decree, were varied. A total of 1,919 workers were
reinstated to remedy discriminatory discharges, while 125 others were
reinstated after strikes caused by unfair labor practices. Back pay amounting
to $997,270 was paid to a total of 1,973 workers who had been the victims
of discriminatory practices. Company-dominated unions were
disestablished in 54 cases. Collective bargaining negotiations were ordered
in 116 cases. The posting of notices was required in 576 cases. 156
During the first year of NLRB operations after the conclusion of WWII,
the cessation of international hostilities occasioned an upsurge in labor
relations conflict in the United States, and challenged the efficacy of NLRB's
dispute processing continuum in numerous ways. As the Board's Eleventh
Annual Report explains:
155 Id. at 253-55 (emphasis added).
156 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 4 (1945), reprinted in 2 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 128.
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Not only was the volume of cases presented to the Board the greatest in its
11-year history, but their character was such that the entire organization
necessarily functioned under great pressure.
The unprecedented number of cases filed with the Board was the
expected aftermath of the sudden termination of hostilities. Due to its
special position in the governmental structure concerned with labor
relations, the Board's case load in effect mirrored what was happening
during the first year after V-J day: It was hardly surprising that the close of
the war should mean the release of tensions distilled during 4 years of
exhortation, unstinting effort, self-discipline, and uncertainty. It was to be
expected that both labor and management, once relieved of wartime
restrictions, would turn to the adjustment of accumulated grievances, real
and fancied. Concurrent with the recession of Government controls on the
price-wage reconversion front, the Nation experienced a geographical
reshuffling of industrial workers, the. shutting down of war plants, the
establishment of new firms, conversion to the production of peacetime
products, a rise in the cost of living, and intensified organizing drives by
labor organizations. All of these elements, incidental to a transitional
economy, made it essential that labor and management have access to the
Board's services, to the end that the transition should be as smooth and
swift as possible. Herein lay the reasons for both the unprecedented number
of cases presented to the Board, and the need for the Board to expedite their
handling.157
Under the pressure of this unprecedented caseload, the NLRB's dispute
processing continuum adapted to the exigencies of the circumstances by
matching the upsurge in caseload with a corresponding rise in settlement
rates:
Congress passed the Wagner Act to provide a peaceful alternative to the
costly strikes which had been fought over the denial of basic rights to union
recognition and collective bargaining. The statute has served the public by
decreasing such strife. The fundamental rights which Congress said should
be the subject of Federal prosecution are no longer being bought at the price
of economic struggle.... As in past years, the great majority of the 10,892
cases processed to conclusion were closed promptly in the informal stages
of administration, without the necessity of hearings, reports, decisions, or
subsequent litigation. Significantly, 91 percent of the unfair labor practice
cases and 74 percent of the representation cases did not require formal
157 11 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 128, at 1.
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action; in both groups this marked an encouraging increase over the
preceding year. 158
In its final year of administering the Wagner Act before the Act was
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (effective August, 1947), the Board's
Twelfth Annual Report noted that the Eightieth Congress considered
approximately 60 bills that concerned federal labor policy. These bills dealt
with, among other things, "such matters as... proposals for labor courts and
compulsory arbitration [and] proposals for mediation and
conciliation .... ,,159 In its final version, the Taft-Hartley Act's amendment
of the NLRA removed part of one clause from the Wagner Act's language
relating to mediation and conciliation recited earlier in this Article, 16 0
namely, the italicized language in the following phrase: "Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the
purpose of conciliation or mediation (or for statistical work), where such
service may be obtainedfrom the Department of Labor."'16 1
After the Taft-Hartley amendments, the NLRA's reference to mediation
and conciliation read: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the
Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or
for economic analysis."' 162 Even this phrase, however, left the Board's staff
free to continue its use of settlement processes to "adjust" cases before it, and
to appoint new staff members to adjust them similarly. Indeed, after passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act, not only did the caseload of the NLRB increase
significantly, but the NLRB's rate of adjusting cases disposed of during the
first two years following the Taft-Hartley Act also increased, considerably
exceeding the settlement percentile range prior to the passage of the Taft-
Hartley amendments. 163
By the second year of the NLRB's implementation of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, the new powers of the NLRB's general counsel were explicitly
discussed in the Fourteenth Annual Report of the Board covering the fiscal
158 Id. at 2, 4.
159 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 128;
see also Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 1901-
36 (1947) (statement of NLRB Chairman Paul M. Herzog before Congress on pending
labor legislation) [hereinafter Hearings].
160 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
161 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 123, at 3272 (S. 1958, 74th
Cong. (1935)) (emphasis added).
162 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, § 4(a) (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87).
163 See supra Figure 6.
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year ending on June 30, 1949. These duties included the investigation of
unfair labor claims by the General Counsel's staff, and the exercise of that
office's authority under the amended NLRA "to effect settlements or
adjustments."164A forthcoming Article will discuss the impact of the Taft-
Hartley and Landrum Griffim amendments on the dispute resolution functions
of the NLRB. 165 At present, it can be said that the NLRB's dispute
processing continuum endures to the present day. 166
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wagner Act's addition of quasi-adjudicatory powers to the law
enforcement repertoire of the NLRB effectively created a full-fledged
"dispute processing continuum" within the institutional framework of that
permanent labor board. This development represented a historical watershed,
marking a bright line in the enforcement of labor rights under federal
legislation by marrying informal processes for resolving disputes, such as
164 14 NLRB Ann. Rep. 9 (1949), reprinted in 2 NLRB REPORTS, supra note 128.
165 The Landrum Griffin Act, known formally as the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-53 1.
166 A classic text on labor law provides a detailed description of the informal stages
of the present continuum-that is, after it was amended by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum
Griffin Acts:
When a charge is filed, the Regional Director normally required the person
making the charge to submit the supporting evidence in the form of affidavits,
lists of witnesses, etc. ... [T]here will commonly be an informal conference at
the local office of the Board, attended by both the respondent and the charging
party, at which the alleged unfair practices are thoroughly discussed and
possible settlements considered. It is important to emphasize the informality of
these investigations, conferences and settlements. Except for such steps as are
required by sound administration, including the reduction to writing of any
settlement agreement, the entire procedure up to this point is conducted with all
possible informality and an eye to amicable adjustments.
The overwhelming preponderance of unfair labor practice cases have
traditionally been disposed of in one way or another in Regional Offices by
these informal personal negotiations. In the fiscal year ending September 30,
1998 (the most recent year for which the Board has published figures), for
example, of the 33,287 unfair labor practices charges that were "closed," 94
percent were closed by the NLRB Regional Offices prior to a formal hearing
(within those cases, approximately 31 percent were disposed of by dismissing
the charge, 31 percent by voluntary withdrawal of the charge, and 33 percent
by settlement).
COX, supra note 9, at 105.
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negotiation, mediation, and conciliation, with quasi-judicial, adjudicatory
process. As a result, ADR and adjudication served complementary functions
in the labor law enforcement activities of the NLRB under the Wagner Act.
The dispute processing continuum that emerged within the NLRB during
the New Deal era is a historical phenomenon comparable to similar
developments in other eras, past and present, where ADR and adjudication
are used in complementary concert within the framework of a legal
system. 167 While the NLRB's dispute processing continuum was the unique
product of the experimental spirit of the New Deal era, the fact that it has
historical and contemporary analogues suggests the possible universality of
the concept of a dispute processing continuum, joining ADR with
adjudication in the framework of a single governmental institution designed
to serve both dispute resolution and law enforcement functions.
167 See generally Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR, supra note 1; Sanchez, Back
to the Future of ADR, supra note 2.
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